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¹ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

² Dead links, as they are termed, may be unearthed at [www.archive.org] and/or [<http://wayback.archive.org/web/>]

I

Beginnings

“Of the Middle Eastern terrorism list countries, the United States engages in bilateral dialogue with all except Iran and Iraq,” though “Iraq has asked for direct talks with the United States, but the United States has rejected the suggestion on the grounds that Iraq is too far from compliance with Gulf war-related requirements to make official talks useful.”

—*CRS Report for Congress, Terrorism:
Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001
(September 10, 2001).*

“It’s easy to imagine an infinite number of situations where the government will legitimately give out false information. It’s an unfortunate reality that the issuance of incomplete information and even misinformation by government may sometimes be perceived as necessary to protect vital interests.”

—*Former U.S. Solicitor General Theodore Olsen*³

Press Release of Intelligence Committee Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence⁴

Two Bipartisan Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, and
Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office
June 5, 2008

The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV, and a bipartisan majority of the Committee (10-5), today unveiled the final two sections of its Phase II report on prewar intelligence. The first report details Administration prewar statements that, on numerous occasions, misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq. The second report details inappropriate, sensitive intelligence activities conducted by the DoD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, without the knowledge of the Intelligence Community or the State Department.

John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV:

“Before taking the country to war, this Administration owed it to the American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the threat we faced. Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the Administration made significant claims that

³ Theodore Olsen’s wife Barbara was killed on September 11, 2001, on Flight AA77 which was involved in the Pentagon attack that day.

⁴ [<http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775>]

were not supported by the intelligence. In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent.

“As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed. It is my belief that the Bush Administration was fixated on Iraq, and used the 9/11 attacks by al-Qa’ida as justification for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. To accomplish this, top Administration officials made repeated statements that falsely linked Iraq and al-Qa’ida as a single threat and insinuated that Iraq played a role in 9/11. Sadly, the Bush Administration led the nation into war under false pretenses.

“There is no question we all relied on flawed intelligence. But, there is a fundamental difference between relying on incorrect intelligence and deliberately painting a picture to the American people that you know is not fully accurate. These reports represent the final chapter in our oversight of prewar intelligence. They complete the story of mistakes and failures - both by the Intelligence Community and the Administration - in the lead up to the war. Fundamentally, these reports are about transparency and holding our government accountable, and making sure these mistakes never happen again.

“The Committee’s report cites several conclusions in which the Administration’s public statements were not supported by the intelligence. They include:

- Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.
- Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.
- Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products.
- Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.
- The Secretary of Defense’s statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were

underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information.

- The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001 as the Vice President repeatedly claimed.

“Additionally, the Committee issued a report on the ‘Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.’ The report found that the clandestine meetings between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris were inappropriate and mishandled from beginning to end. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz failed to keep the Intelligence Community and the State Department appropriately informed about the meetings. The involvement of Manucher Ghobanifer and Michael Ledeen in the meetings was inappropriate. Potentially important information collected during the meetings was withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials. Finally, senior Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts.”

Today’s reports are the culmination of efforts that began in March 2003, when, as Vice Chairman, Senator Rockefeller initially requested an investigation into the origin of the fraudulent *Niger Documents*. In June 2003, he was joined by all Democrats on the Committee in pushing for a full investigation into prewar intelligence, which was eventually expanded by the Committee in February 2004 to include the five phase II tasks.

The Committee released its first report on July 9, 2004, which focused primarily on the Intelligence Community’s prewar assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism. Those findings helped lay the foundation for some of the intelligence reforms enacted into law in late 2004. In September 2006, the Committee completed and publicly released two sections of Phase II: ‘The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress; and Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments.’ In May 2007, the Committee released the third section of Phase II: ‘Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq.’ Separately, in early 2007, the Pentagon Inspector General released its own report on the intelligence activities conducted by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and also concluded that those activities were inappropriate.

END OF PRESS RELEASE

The following statement comes from the CRS Report for Congress on September 10, 2001, one day before the 9/11 attacks: “Before the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, some of Abd al-Rahman’s aides reportedly had personal contact with bin Laden associates in the United States. Although their recruiting presence has raised questions as to whether or not the United States gave bin Laden or Abd al-Rahman assistance during the Afghan war, the

Central Intelligence Agency has told CRS that it found no evidence that the Agency provided any direct assistance to either of them. The U.S. assistance program for the anti-Soviet groups in Afghanistan focused primarily on indigenous Afghan mujahedin and not Arab volunteers such as those sponsored by bin Laden or Abd al-Rahman.”⁵

Pakistani Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who ran the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Afghan operation between 1983 and 1987 noted how “It was always galling to the Americans, and I can understand their point of view, that although they paid the piper they could not call the tune. The CIA supported the mujahideen by spending the taxpayers’ money, billions of dollars of it over the years, on buying arms, ammunition, and equipment. It was their secret arms procurement branch that was kept busy. It was, however, a cardinal rule of Pakistan’s policy that no Americans ever become involved with the distribution of funds or arms once they arrived in the country. No Americans ever trained or had direct contact with the mujahideen, and no American official ever went inside Afghanistan.”⁶

CIA Director in 2001 was George Tenet; here is what he tells us regarding bin Laden’s connection with the CIA during the Afghan-Soviet war: “Internet-based conspiracy theorists keep alive the rumor that bin Laden had somehow worked for the CIA during the Afghan-Soviet war or had more informal contacts with American officials during that time. Let me state categorically that CIA had no contact with bin Laden during the Soviet’s Afghan misadventure.)”⁷

Dr. Rice states, “When the Soviet Union was defeated in 1989, some of the equipment and support that the United States had provided to the mujahideen stayed behind and added significantly to the further militarization of the region.”⁸

And finally, note in the following declassified document how Usama bin Laden is termed a U.S. Government Official and added as one of the recipients for the weapons sold as described in the document.

⁵ CRS Report for Congress, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001 (September 10, 2001).

⁶ Peter Bergen, *Holy War Inc.*, New York: Free Press, 2001 (p.66).

⁷ George Tenet “At the center of the storm: My Years at the CIA.” P. 101, HarperCollins (2007).

⁸ Condoleezza Rice “No Higher Honor.” Crown Publishing Group (2011).

JUST A SIMPLE and CONTINUING REMINDER OF ... PREVIOUS USG INTEL
FIELD REPORTS ON FILE AND FULLY DOCUMENTED

ITEM 1 ... (TIM OSMAN and RALPH OLBERG / U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AFGHAN DESK, et al. VISITATION w/
US GOVERNMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS [OSMAN = USAMA/OSAMA
BIN LADIN/OBL])

SITUATION: SSAC TED GUNDERSON, FBI/DD OPS/LA-
MILTON/SHERMANOAKS/CA/USA

ITEM 2 ... GENERAL DYNAMICS STINGER SALES/TRANSFERS VIA
MUDJAHEDDIN, JOHN TAYLOR, SCOTT
PARTRIDGE, HERR ANDRAS SZASZ, et al

ITEM 3 ... PLANTRONIKS GmbH, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY OPERATIONS;
NORTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, USSR, et al...
VIA HERR PRESIDENT ANDRAS SZASZ, AND THEIR INTEL
OPERATIONS GROUPE

M 4 ... PROMIS UPGRADE / MICHAEL RYKONSCIUTO, et al - BILL
MILTON/INSLAW-WSHDC.ops

M 5 ... MANAGEMENT SCIENCES of HEALTH [MSH] - ref. U. S. SENATOR
STE DURENBERGER, et al
WANTA SENATORIAL SPONSOR FOR U. S. DEPARTMENT of
SENSE - INSPECTOR GENERAL

ITEM 6 ... USG APPROVAL and DELIVERY OF:

- a. MANPADS / MAN PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
- b. HNSA PRC-POLYTECH CLONE RED-EYE EQUIPMENT AND
TRAINING, i.e., NIC/CONTRAS OPS/DELIVERY
- c. IGLA and STRELLA USSR SAM ops/DELIVERY
- d. GENERAL AZIZ / WIEN ops FIELD REPORTS and RED
MERCURY 2020 USSR/IRAQI DELIVERY and INTEL OPS
REF: IRAQI MILITARY ACADEMY COMMANDANT
GENERAL AZIZ and OUR NEW REPUBLIC/USA
FINANCIAL GROUP, LTD GES. m.b.H. (AUSTRIA, S.C. 18,
sec 6) INTEL SUPPORT and PERSONAL LIFE
SAVING FINANCIAL PROGRAMME and HOUSING
ALLOWANCES
- e. USA SAM COHEN: ... A-NEUTRONIC BOMB
DESIGN/TESTING/DELIVERY ... USG FIELD REPORTS

PLEASE SEE "AmeriTrust CORPORATION EMBARGO" RELEASE IN USG

Handwritten notes: Scripted, Sherman, A8, OAKS, R200, HICION, PIVOT, Sherman, OAKS, 1201

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State under three different administrations, Dr. Steve Pieczenik, reported he was prepared to tell a federal grand jury the name of a top general who told him directly that 9/11 was a false-flag attack, ⁹ and how bin Laden, "Was used in the same way that 9/11 was used to mobilize the emotions and feelings of the American people in order to go to a war that had to be justified through a narrative that Bush junior created and Cheney created about the world of terrorism."

⁹ [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TeML3ANprI&feature=player_embedded#at=33]

Dr. Pieczenik also asserted in the interview on the *Alex Jones Show*: “They ran the attacks,” naming Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley, Elliott Abrams, and Condoleezza Rice amongst others as having been directly involved. “It was called a stand down, a false-flag operation in order to mobilize the American public under false pretenses. It was told to me even by the general on the staff of Wolfowitz. I will go in front of a federal committee and swear on perjury who the name was of the individual so that we can break it open,” said Pieczenik, adding that he was “furious” and “knew it had happened. I taught stand down and false-flag operations at the national war college, I’ve taught it with all my operatives so I knew exactly what was done to the American public,” he added. Pieczenik explained that he was not a liberal, a conservative or a tea party member, merely an American who is deeply concerned about the direction in which his country is heading.

Pretexts and cover techniques have been used by the FBI since 1956. The following declassified document, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), will give an idea on how law enforcement bodies worked and probably still work.

PRETEXTS & COVER TECHNIQUES
(Not for Dissemination outside the Bureau)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
John Edgar Hoover, Director

May 1956

Webster’s New International Dictionary defines a pretext as: “A purpose or motive alleged, or an appearance assumed, in order to cloak the real intention or state of affairs; excuse; pretense; cover; semblance.” As related to investigative work, the pretext technique is a lawful means to an investigative end.

Considerations in Planning & Using Pretexts

The pretext is a deliberate and planned technique. In some situations, it is without equal as the fastest and surest means of obtaining the information sought. Basically, the pretext is used when it is necessary to accomplish an investigative end without disclosing the Bureau’s interest in a matter and/or the true purpose of the inquiry. The primary considerations in selecting the pretext to be used are:

1. The investigative problem to be solved
2. The nature of the person to be contacted under pretext

Pretexts offer unlimited possibilities to an investigator with imagination and ingenuity; a good pretext should: Be carefully planned; be as simple and reasonable as possible; offer an inducement or have a spontaneous appeal; contain accurate statements or statements not

susceptible to verification; consider the intelligence and nature of person to be contacted; provide for logical conclusion or follow-through; stay within the framework of our laws.

In some instances, the use of a dialect or expressions familiar to subjects has been advantageous. Of these two, the successful use of a dialect is the more difficult for most agents. A dialect should only be used where the agent has considerable ability either acquired through environment or developed through study and practice. Agents conversant with communist terminology have used this knowledge to good advantage during pretexts. In criminal investigations, the use of slang and double-meaning expressions familiar to the criminal element has assisted in supporting a pretext or cover. In effect, some pretexts require that the agent speak the subject's language.

The need for planning cannot be overly stressed. This planning should consider the alternatives open to subject and provision for these alternatives. With proper preparation for subject's reactions, the pretext will be flexible and more readily adaptable during the course of the interview. Wherever possible, the pretext must be brought to a logical conclusion, and where there is a need to follow through to maintain the pretext, this should be done.

A well-known quotation, which is generally attributed to Abraham Lincoln, reads, "You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all the time." If we are to deal with subjects who would fool us, then, our agents who are conducting pretext interviews must be aware of this fact and on using pretexts look and act the part.

If an agent is pretending to be a fisherman, the pretext should be carried out during the fishing season with the proper clothes and fishing equipment. If using the pretext of being an insurance salesman, the agent should carry an insurance manual with the necessary rate charts and policy data. These are simple but convincing "props." A few simple changes in outward appearance will do more to convey the desired impression than several minutes of a cover story. To alter an old Chinese proverb, one "prop" is worth a thousand words.

END OF DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC SCRUTINY

Former CIA official, Milt Bearden talked about bin Laden's non-existent involvement in 9/11 and how the CIA trained bin Laden. Everything stated in this video by Mr. Bearden has now been admitted by the White House and here are some statements to confirm Bearden's claims which can be seen and heard in the video link found in the footnote.¹⁰

¹⁰ [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wn61PJQGUo&feature=player_embedded]

“We’ve never made the case, or argued the case that somehow Usama bin Laden was directly involved in 9/11. That evidence has never been forthcoming.”

—*Ex-Vice President Dick Cheney interview by Tony Snow*
(March 29, 2006) ¹¹

“9/11 is not mentioned on Usama Bin Laden’s Most Wanted page. He has not been formally indicted and charged in connection with 9/11 because the FBI has no hard evidence connected bin Laden to 9/11.”

—*FBI Agent Rex Tomb*
(June 6, 2006)

“The goal has never been to get bin Laden.”

—*General Richard Myers*
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

CNN

Bin Laden says he wasn’t behind attacks
September 17, 2001. ¹²

DOHA, Qatar (CNN) - Islamic militant leader Usama bin Laden, the man the United States considers the prime suspect in last week’s terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, denied any role Sunday in the actions believed to have killed thousands. In a statement issued to the Arabic satellite channel *Al Jazeera*, based in Qatar, bin Laden said, “The U.S. government has consistently blamed me for being behind every occasion its enemies attack it. I would like to assure the world that I did not plan the recent attacks, which seems to have been planned by people for personal reasons,” bin Laden’s statement said. “I have been living in the Islamic emirate of Afghanistan and following its leaders’ rules. The current leader does not allow me to exercise such operations,” bin Laden said. Asked Sunday if he believed bin Laden’s denial, President Bush said, “No question he is the prime suspect. No question about that.” Since Tuesday’s terrorist attacks against the United States, Bush has repeatedly threatened to strike out against terrorism and any nation that supports or harbours its disciples. Bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi-born exile, has lived in Afghanistan for several years. U.S. officials blame him for earlier strikes on U.S. targets, including last year’s attack on the USS Cole in Yemen and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. Bin Laden’s campaign stems from the 1990 decision by Saudi Arabia to allow U.S. troops into the kingdom after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: A military presence that has become permanent.

In a 1997 *CNN* interview, bin Laden called the U.S. military presence an “occupation of the land of the holy places.” Immediately after the attacks that demolished the World Trade Center’s landmark twin towers and seriously damaged the Pentagon, officials of Afghanistan’s

¹¹ [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060329-2.html]

¹² [http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/inv.binladen.denial/]

ruling Taliban said they doubted bin Laden could have been involved in carrying out the actions. The Taliban (the fundamentalist Islamic militia that seized power in Afghanistan in 1996) denied his ties to terrorism and said they have taken away all his means of communication with the outside world. The repressive Taliban regime has received almost universal condemnation, particularly for their harsh treatment of women. Only three countries, including Pakistan, recognize them as the country's rightful government. A high-level Pakistani delegation was set to travel to Afghanistan on Monday to urge Taliban supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar to hand over bin Laden, *CNN* learned Sunday. The Taliban, which controls more than 90% of the country, has threatened any neighbouring country that allows its soil to be used to help the U.S. stage an attack on Afghanistan.

**Fair Use:* For more information see footnote. ¹³

“Initially, we believed bin Laden was principally a financier, and in January 1996 we described him as such, but Alec Station ¹⁴ was quickly putting together a picture of someone who was more than a Saudi dilettante with deep pockets and a hatred for the West. UBL, we were learning, was an engine of evil.”

George Tenet
(CIA Director 2001) ¹⁵

“After the capture of Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and others, we continued to hope we'd find Osama bin Laden. Some people contend that we had a chance to capture or kill him at Tora Bora in the waning stages of the initial Afghan campaign in 2001. In fact, there were conflicting reports about his whereabouts at the time, and as a result the military did not request additional forces to conduct a strike. To my knowledge, the President was never asked to make a decision about a possible operation. But one thing is certain: If we had known where bin Laden was, we would have done absolutely everything in our power to take him down.”

Dr Condoleezza Rice ¹⁶

Now notice the official FBI's Most Wanted announcement on their Website regarding Usama bin Laden. The page no longer exists, however, can be found through the footnote link. ¹⁷

¹³ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

¹⁴ Alec Station: A “virtual station” set up within CIA's Counterterrorist Center in 1996 to focus specifically on Al-Qa'ida. Originally designed TFL (Terrorist Financial Links), it became known informally as the Bin Laden Station.

¹⁵ George Tenet “At the center of the storm: My Years at the CIA.” P. 102, HarperCollins. (2007).

¹⁶ Condoleezza Rice “No Higher Honor.” Crown Publishing Group (2011).

¹⁷ [<http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/Usama-bin-laden>]



THE FBI
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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CONTACT US | ABOUT US | MOST WANTED | NEWS | STATS & SERVICES | SCAMS & SAFETY | JOBS | FUN & GAMES

Wanted by the FBI

Home • Most Wanted • Ten Most Wanted • USAMA BIN LADEN

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FBI TEN MOST WANTED FUGITIVE

Murder of U.S. Nationals Outside the United States; Conspiracy to Murder U.S. Nationals Outside the United States; Attack on a Federal Facility Resulting in Death

USAMA BIN LADEN



Deceased

Date of Photograph
Unknown

Multimedia: Images

Aliases:

Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin, Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin, the Prince, the Emir, Abu Abdallah, Mujahid Shaykh, Hajj, the Director

DESCRIPTION

Date(s) of Birth Used:	1957	Hair:	Brown
Place of Birth:	Saudi Arabia	Eyes:	Brown
Height:	6' 4" to 6' 6"	Complexion:	Olive
Weight:	Approximately 160 pounds	Sex:	Male
Build:	Thin	Nationality:	Saudi Arabian
Occupation:	Unknown		

Scars and Marks: None known

Remarks:

Bin Laden is the leader of a terrorist organization known as Al-Qaeda, "The Base". He is left-handed and walks with a cane.

CAUTION

Usama Bin Laden is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States Emu. Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These attacks killed over 200 people. In addition, Bin Laden is a s, terrorist attacks throughout the world.

Shaykh,

REWARD

The Rewards For Justice Program, United States Department of State, is offering a reward of up to \$25 million f information leading directly to the apprehension or conviction of Usama Bin Laden. An additional \$2 million is l offered through a program developed and funded by the Airline Pilots Association and the Air Transport Associ:

CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS

If you have any information concerning this person, please contact your local FBI office or the near Embassy or Consulate.

Field Office: New York

June 1999

Poster Revised November 2001

Poster Classification: Ten Most Wanted Fugitives

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Accessibility | eRulemaking | Freedom of Information Act | Legal Notices | Legal Policies and Disclaimers | Links | Privacy Policy | USA.gov | White House
 FBI.gov is an official site of the U.S. Federal Government, U.S. Department of Justice

Note again the date the poster of bin Laden, termed “DECEASED” when it was revised. Further on this subject can be found in the footlink: ¹⁸

FBI — USAMA BIN LADEN

Poster Revised November 2001

Poster Classification: Ten Most Wanted Fugitives



In general, the FBI is a federal law enforcement and civilian agency that operates 57 field offices in major cities throughout the U.S. and in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Their governing body is the United States Congress. In their Handbook of Forensics (revised edition 2007) and under the chapter “Crime Scene Search,” it states how “a crime scene search is planned, coordinated, and executed by law enforcement officials to locate physical evidence.”

The only “physical evidence” produced to the public from all three crime scenes of the September 11 attacks, being the tower complex, the Pentagon, and the Shanksville field area, was hastily put together, and produced the following items:

- A passport belonging to Atta reported stolen in 1999
- Credit cards
- Boeing aircraft manuals
- Aeronautical maps
- Martial arts books
- A red bandana
- A driver’s license
- A copy of the Koran
- One last Will & Testament

The following report is a redacted and unclassified version of the full report that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed in July 2004 and provided at that time to the FBI, the Department of Justice, the Congress, the CIA, the NSA, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The OIG’s full report is classified at the Top

¹⁸ [<http://www.scribd.com/doc/65125486/Peddling-Power-1-Flight-AA11>]

Secret/SCI level. We will only give a flavour of the report as it can be found in full on the OIG's Website.

A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Prior
To the September 11 Attacks
Special Report
November 2004 (Released Publicly June 2005)
Office of the Inspector General

At the request of members of Congress, after issuing the full report the Office of the Inspector General created an unclassified 371-page version of the report. Because the unclassified report included information about the FBI's investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, and because of the pendency of the prosecution of Moussaoui in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and the rules of that Court, the Office of the Inspector General could not release the unclassified version of the report without the Court's permission.

On February 1, 2005, the Office of the Inspector General filed a motion in the District Court requesting leave to release publicly the unclassified report, including the information about Moussaoui. Moussaoui's defense counsel objected to the release of any information related to Moussaoui and certain other information. The Court denied the Office of the Inspector General's motion on April 28, 2005. Thereafter, the Office of the Inspector General redacted from the report the information requested by Moussaoui's defense counsel.

On June 7, 2005, the Office of the Inspector General filed a motion with the Court requesting leave to release publicly the redacted, unclassified version of the report, and the Court granted the motion. This is the redacted, unclassified version of the report. In the future, when the Moussaoui case is concluded and with the Court's permission, the Office of the Inspector General intends to release the full unclassified report, including the information that was redacted from this version.

I. Introduction

On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked 4 commercial airplanes as part of a coordinated terrorist attack against the United States. Two of the planes crashed into the World Trade Center Towers in New York City and one hit the Pentagon near Washington, D.C. The fourth plane crashed in a field in southwestern Pennsylvania. More than 3,000 persons were killed in these terrorist attacks.

On February 14, 2002, the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence began a joint inquiry to address questions related to the September 11 attacks, such as "what the Intelligence Community knew prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of any possible terrorist attacks; what was done with that information" and "how and to what degree the elements of the Intelligence Community have interacted with each other, as well as with other parts of the

federal, state, and local governments, with respect to identifying, tracking, assessing, and coping with international terrorist threats.”¹⁹ This review became known as the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry or “the JICI review.”

One of the key questions arising after the attacks was what information the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) knew before September 11 that was potentially related to the terrorist attacks. On May 21, 2002, Coleen Rowley, the Chief Division Counsel in the FBI’s Minneapolis Field Office,²⁰ wrote a 13-page letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller in which she raised concerns about how the FBI had handled certain information in its possession before the attacks.

In addition, the Director asked the Office of the Inspector General to review the issues in an Electronic Communication (EC) written by an FBI Special Agent in Phoenix (known as the Phoenix EC), as well as “any other matters relating to the FBI’s handling of information and/or intelligence before September 11, 2001 that might relate in some manner to the September 11, 2001 attacks.”

The Phoenix EC was a memorandum sent by an agent in the FBI’s Phoenix office in July 2001 to FBI Headquarters and to the FBI’s New York Field Office.²¹ The Phoenix EC outlined the agent’s theory that there was a coordinated effort by Usama bin Laden to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges for the purpose of obtaining jobs in the civil aviation industry to conduct terrorist activity. The EC also recommended that FBI Headquarters instruct field offices to obtain student identification information from civil aviation schools, request the Department of State to provide visa information about foreign students attending U.S. civil aviation schools, and seek information from other intelligence agencies that might relate to his theory. At the time of the September 11 attacks, little action had been taken in response to the Phoenix EC.

The Office of the Inspector General agreed to conduct a review in response to the FBI Director’s request. In conducting our review, the Office of the Inspector General investigators also learned that prior to the September 11 attacks the Intelligence Community had acquired a significant amount of intelligence about two of the hijackers: Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar.²² Well before September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community had discovered that Hazmi and Mihdhar had met with other al-Qa’ida operatives in Malaysia in January 2000.

The CIA also had discovered that Mihdhar possessed a valid U.S Visa and that Hazmi had traveled to the United States in January 2000. The FBI contended, however, that it was not

¹⁹ The U.S. “Intelligence Community” is composed of 14 agencies responsible for collecting intelligence information on behalf of the government and includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

²⁰ The CDC provides legal counsel and advice to field office management, supervisors, and agents on administrative and operational matters.

²¹ This document has commonly been referred to as “the Phoenix memo” or “the Phoenix EC.” Throughout this report, we use the term “Phoenix EC” to refer to this document.

²² Hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon.

informed of Mihdhar's U.S. Visa and Hazmi's travel to the United States until August 2001, just before the September 11 attacks. At that time, the FBI had initiated an investigation to locate Mihdhar and Hazmi, but the FBI was not close to finding them at the time of the September 11 attacks. The OIG also learned that Hazmi and Mihdhar had resided in the San Diego area in 2000, where they interacted with a former subject of an FBI investigation and lived as boarders in the home of an FBI source. The Office of the Inspector General therefore decided to include in its review an investigation of the intelligence information available to the FBI about Hazmi and Mihdhar before September 11 and the FBI's handling of that intelligence information.

In December 2002, the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry released its final report entitled, "Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001." One of the report's recommendations was for the Inspectors General at the Department of Justice (DOJ), CIA, Department of Defense, and Department of State to determine whether and to what extent personnel at those agencies should be held accountable for any acts or omissions with regard to the identification, prevention, and disruption of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

II. The Office of the Inspector General investigation

The Office of the Inspector General's review focused on the FBI's handling of the Phoenix EC, [REDACTED] and the intelligence information about Mihdhar and Hazmi. To review these issues, the Office of the Inspector General assembled a team of four attorneys, three special agents, and two auditors. The team conducted 225 interviews of personnel from the Department of Justice, FBI, CIA, and other agencies. For example, we interviewed FBI personnel from FBI Headquarters; from FBI field offices in Minneapolis, San Diego, New York, Phoenix, and Oklahoma; and from FBI offices overseas. We also interviewed employees from the CIA, the INS, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). We reviewed over 14,000 pages of documents we obtained from the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, and Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry.

Our review of the FBI's handling of the Hazmi and Mihdhar matter required us to obtain a significant amount of information from the CIA regarding its interactions with the FBI on that matter. To conduct our review, we thus had to rely on the cooperation of the CIA in providing us access to CIA witnesses and documents. We were able to obtain CIA documents and interviewed CIA witnesses, but we did not have the same access to the CIA that we had to the Department of Justice information and employees. We also note that the CIA and the Office of the Inspector General is conducting its own inquiry of the CIA's actions with regard to the Mihdhar and Hazmi matter.

III. Organization of the Office of the Inspector General report

This report is organized into six chapters. Chapter One contains this introduction. Chapter Two provides general background on the issues discussed in this report. For example, it contains descriptions of key terminology, the FBI's organizational structure, the so-called "wall" that separated intelligence and criminal investigations in the FBI and the Department

of Justice, the process for obtaining a FISA warrant, and other legal background issues related to how the FBI investigated terrorism and intelligence cases before September 11, 2001. Because the background chapter contains basic terminology and concepts, those with more extensive knowledge of these issues may not need to read this chapter in full.

Chapter Three evaluates the FBI's handling of the Phoenix EC. As an initial matter, we provide background on how "leads" were assigned in the FBI before September 11, 2001, and we summarize the contents of the Phoenix EC. We then describe in detail how the Phoenix EC was handled within the FBI before September 11. In the analysis section of Chapter Three, we examine problems in how the Phoenix EC was handled, first focusing on the systemic problems that affected the way the FBI treated the EC and then discussing the performance of the individuals involved with the EC. At the end of the chapter we discuss several other pieces of information in the possession of the FBI before September 11 that also noted connections of potential terrorists to the aviation industry or the use of airplanes.

In Chapter Five, we examine the FBI's handling of intelligence information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar. We found that, beginning in late 1999 and continuing through September 11, 2001, the FBI had at least five opportunities to learn of intelligence information about Mihdhar and Hazmi which could have led it to focus on them before the September 11 attacks. In this chapter, we describe each of these five opportunities in detail. We describe the intelligence information regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar that existed at the time, whether the information was made available to the FBI, and what additional information about Hazmi and Mihdhar the FBI could have developed on its own. In the analysis section of this chapter, we evaluate the problems that impeded the FBI's handling of the information about Hazmi and Mihdhar before September 11, and we also address the performance of the individuals involved in the Hazmi and Mihdhar case.

In Chapter Six, we set forth our recommendations for systemic improvements in the FBI and we summarize our conclusions. [REDACTED] At that time, the Office of the Inspector General provided the report, which was classified at the TOP SECRET/SCI level, to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission). The 9/11 Commission used certain information from our report in its final report. In July 2004, we also provided our classified report to certain congressional committees with oversight of the Department of Justice, including the House of Representatives and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. At the request of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Office of the Inspector General has created this 370-page unclassified version of the report. To do so, we worked with the FBI, the CIA, and the NSA to delete classified information from our full report. However, the substance of the report has not changed, and we believe that this unclassified version fairly summarizes the findings of the full report.

END OF EXTRACT

In the report's Chapter Two: Background, it states "The FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use or threatened use of violence committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. When such violent acts are carried out by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States without foreign direction, they are considered acts of domestic terrorism, such as the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. When such acts are committed by an individual or group based or operating outside of the United States, they are considered acts of international terrorism, such as the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.²³ According to the FBI, there are three main categories of international terrorist threats to U.S. interests: Formal, structured terrorist organizations;²⁴ state sponsors international terrorism;²⁵ and loosely affiliated Islamic extremists.²⁶ According to Dale Watson, the former Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, the trend in international terrorism has been a shift away from state sponsors of terrorism and formalized terrorist organizations towards loosely affiliated religious extremists who claim Islam as their faith. Among these Islamic extremists is Usama bin Laden, who heads the al-Qa'ida transnational terrorist network. Al-Qaida leaders were harboured in Afghanistan by the Taliban regime from 1996 until the U.S. military operations there in 2001. In addition to the September 11 attacks, al-Qa'ida was responsible for the bombing of the *USS Cole* in Yemen on October 12, 2000, the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, and numerous other terrorist attacks."

What this report fails to announce and/or report is al-Qa'ida's origins and links to the CIA, according to mainstream media and whistleblowers that have come forward.

²³ See the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual, Section 2-1.1.

²⁴ Formal, structured terrorist organizations are those with their own personnel, infrastructures, financial arrangements, and training facilities. Such groups include al-Qa'ida, the Palestinian Hamas, the Irish Republican Army, the Egyptian Al-Gama Al-Islamiyya, and the Lebanese Hizbollah. Hizbollah, for example, carried out numerous attacks on Americans overseas, including the October 1983 vehicle bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon and the June 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.

²⁵ According to the FBI, as of 2001 the primary state sponsors of terrorism were Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya.

²⁶ This is sometimes referred to as the "Islamic Jihad Movement" or the "International Jihad Movement."

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Al-Qaeda's origins and links

Al-Qaeda's leaders: (From left) Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden and Mohammed Atef

Al-Qaeda, meaning "the base", was created in 1989 as Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and Osama Bin Laden and his colleagues began looking for new jihads.

The organisation grew out of the network of Arab volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight under the banner of Islam against Soviet Communism.

During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA.

The "Arab Afghans", as they became known, were battle-hardened and highly motivated.

In the early 1990s Al-Qaeda operated in Sudan. After 1996 its headquarters and about a dozen training camps moved to Afghanistan, where Bin Laden forged a close relationship with the Taliban.

The US campaign in Afghanistan starting in late 2001 dispersed the organisation and drove it underground as its personnel were attacked and its bases and training camps destroyed.

Cells across the world

The organisation is thought to operate in 40 to 50 countries, not only in the Middle East and Asia but in North America and Europe.

In western Europe there have been known or suspected cells in London, Hamburg, Milan and Madrid. These have been important centres for recruitment, fundraising and planning operations.

For training, the group favours lawless areas where it can operate freely and in secret.

These are believed to have included Somalia, Yemen and

INVESTIGATING AL-QAEDA

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BACKGROUND

Day of terror

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Attacks attributed to al-Qaeda or associates

- 1993: World Trade Center bombing
- 1996: Killing of 19 US soldiers in Saudi Arabia
- 1998: East African bombings

Chechnya, as well as mountainous areas of Afghanistan.

There have been reports of a secret training camp on one of the islands of Indonesia.

- ♦ 2000: Attack on USS Cole in Yemen
- ♦ 2001: Suicide attacks on New York and Washington
- ♦ 2002: Attack on Israeli tourists in Mombasa
- ♦ 2003: Four simultaneous bomb attacks in Riyadh

Unlike the tightly-knit groups of the past, such as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Abu Nidal group in the Middle East, al-Qaeda is loosely knit. It operates across continents as a chain of interlocking networks.

Individual groups or cells appear to have a high degree of autonomy, raising their own money, often through petty crime, and making contact with other groups only when necessary.

Defining al-Qaeda?

This loose connection between groups has raised a question of definition. When we talk about al-Qaeda do we refer to an actual organisation or are we now talking about something closer to an idea?

Attacks like the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh and the attack on Israeli tourists in Mombasa in 2002 are widely attributed to al-Qaeda. But were these attacks in any way planned or financed or organised by Bin Laden or the organisation he is still believed to lead?

Al-Qaeda's main figures

- ♦ **At large:** Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahri
- ♦ **Captured by US:** Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah
- ♦ **On trial:** Zacarias Moussaoui, Mounir al-Motassadek
- ♦ **Jailed:** Richard Reid
- ♦ **Believed dead:** Mohammed Atef

Who's who in al-Qaeda

Some analysts have suggested that the word al-Qaeda is now used to refer to a variety of groups connected by little more than shared aims, ideals and methods.

We do however know that several radical groups are or have been formally affiliated with al-Qaeda. The most important is the radical wing of the Egyptian group Islamic Jihad whose members took refuge in Afghanistan and merged with al-Qaeda.

Its leader is Ayman al-Zawahri, a ruthless Egyptian believed to be the brains behind al-Qaeda and the mastermind of many of its most infamous operations.

These include the attacks on two US embassies in Africa in 1998 and the 11 September attacks against New York and Washington.

There are also believed to be links with:

- Militant Kashmiri groups
- The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU
- The Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines;
- The GIA, or Armed Islamic Group, in Algeria and its radical offshoot known as the Salafist group, or GSPC.

'War on terror'

The Times of India

CIA worked in tandem with Pak to create Taliban

March 7, 2001

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"CIA worked in tandem with Pak to create Taliban"

LONDON: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked in tandem with Pakistan to create the "monster" that is today Afghanistan's ruling Taliban, a leading US expert on South Asia said here.

"I warned them that we were creating a monster," Selig Harrison from the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars said at the conference here last week on "Terrorism and Regional Security: Managing the Challenges in Asia."

Harrison said: "The CIA made a historic mistake in encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan." The US provided \$3 billion for building up these Islamic groups, and it accepted Pakistan's demand that they should decide how this money should be spent, Harrison said.

Harrison, who spoke before the Taliban assault on the Buddha statues was launched, told the gathering of security experts that he had meetings with CIA leaders at the time when Islamic forces were being strengthened in Afghanistan. "They told me these people were fanatical, and the more fierce they were the more fiercely they would fight the Soviets," he said. "I warned them that we were creating a monster."

Harrison, who has written five books on Asian affairs and US relations with Asia, has had extensive contact with the CIA and political leaders in South Asia. Harrison was a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1974 and 1996.

Harrison who is now senior fellow with The Century Foundation recalled a conversation he had with the late Gen Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan. "Gen Zia

spoke to me about expanding Pakistan's sphere of influence to control Afghanistan, then Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and then Iran and Turkey," Harrison said. That design continues, he said. Gen. Mohammed Aziz who was involved in that Zia plan has been elevated now to a key position by Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Harrison said.

The old associations between the intelligence agencies continue, Harrison said. "The CIA still has close links with the ISI (Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence)."

Today that money and those weapons have helped build up the Taliban, Harrison said. "The Taliban are not just recruits from 'madrassas' (Muslim theological schools) but are on the payroll of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence, the intelligence wing of the Pakistani government)." The Taliban are now "making a living out of terrorism."

Harrison said the UN Security Council resolution number 1333 calls for an embargo on arms to the Taliban. "But it is a resolution without teeth because it does not provide sanctions for non-compliance," he said. "The US is not backing the Russians who want to give more teeth to the resolution."

Now it is Pakistan that "holds the key to the future of Afghanistan," Harrison said. The creation of the Taliban was central to Pakistan's "pan-Islamic vision," Harrison said.

It came after "the CIA made the historic mistake of encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan," he said. The creation of the Taliban had been "actively encouraged by the ISI and the CIA," he said. "Pakistan has been building up Afghan collaborators who will sustain Pakistan," he said. (IANS)

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ²⁷

Attorney General John Ashcroft testified to the Commission that specific information sharing failures in the summer of 2001 arose from Attorney General Reno's July 1995 procedures and specifically from the March 1995 memorandum signed by Deputy Attorney General Gorelick. ²⁸ A review of the facts surrounding the information sharing failures, however, demonstrate that the Attorney General's testimony did not fairly and accurately reflect the significance of the 1995 documents and their relevance to the 2001 discussions. There were three occasions in

²⁷ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

²⁸ John Ashcroft testimony, April 13, 2004.

the summer of 2001 when questions were raised regarding what information could be shared and with whom. One occasion involved decisions whether to seek a criminal warrant or a FISA warrant for Zacarias Moussaoui's laptop computer and other possessions. The other two of these occasions related to information gathered by the NSA in December 1999 regarding Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi.

What had happened was a growing battle within the Department of Justice during the 1990s, and between parts of Justice and the FISA court, over the scope of OIPR's screening function and the propriety of using FISA-derived information in criminal matters. The FISA court's concern with FBI sloppiness also began to take a toll, resulting in 9/11 Classified Information the FBI being required to separately designate criminal and intelligence agents; and the court banning one FBI supervisor from appearing before it. By late 2000, these factors had culminated in a set of complex rules and a widening set of beliefs – a bureaucratic culture – that discouraged FBI agents from even seeking to share intelligence information. Neither Attorney General Reno nor Attorney General Ashcroft acted to resolve the conflicting views within the Department of Justice or challenged the strict interpretation of the FISA statute espoused by the FISA court and OIPR.

It is clear, therefore, that the information sharing failures in the summer of 2001 were not the result of legal barriers but of the failure of individuals to understand that the barriers did not apply to the facts at hand. Simply put, there was no legal reason why the information could not have been shared.

The censored area “9/11 Classified Information” may be open to debate; it could have simply stated, the results were some discipline actions made in order “the FBI being required to separately designate criminal and intelligence agents.”

From the “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001” (JICI Report) which was compiled on December 20, 2002, and presented as defendant exhibit 539-F at Zacarias Moussaoui's trial, “Central to the September 11 attacks was the terrorists' use of airplanes as weapons, which National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice addressed in a May 2002 press briefing: ‘All of this reporting about hijacking was about traditional hijacking. You take a plane, people were worried they might blow one up, but they were most worried that they might try to take a plane and use it for release of the blind Sheikh or some of their own people.’”

As we saw, the War Games conducted on 9/11, four of them to be exact, had scenarios prepare the military for airliners crashing into buildings on U.S. soil. Specifically, war-game *Vigilant Guardian* was a participant or observer in the following: NORAD exercise includes scenarios of an attempted suicide plane taken over by hijackers to deliberately crash into the United Nations headquarters in New York. Another scenario would be a FedEx MD-11 aircraft deliberately crashing into a skyscraper in New York. The two scenarios were practiced on October 16 and October 23 as part of NORAD's annual command post exercise called *Vigilant Guardian*. All of NORAD, including its Northeast Air Defense Sector based in Rome, New York, participates in this exercise. This is well documented by the U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services, on August 17, 2004, and also reported by



GlobalSecurity on April 27, 2005. Furthermore, Gen. Richard Myers, (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), would later describe the scenario practiced on October 16:

“Due to recent arrests involving illegal drug trafficking in Maine, an individual steals a Federal Express plane and plans a suicide attack into the United Nations building in New York City.”


In response to the simulated crisis, exercise participants follow hijack checklists, exercise command and control, and coordinate with external agencies.

So when the Joint Inquiry confirmed that, before September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community produced at least twelve reports over a seven-year period suggesting that terrorists might use airplanes as weapons on U.S. soil, the first if not the additional person who would know this, would be the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice. If she did not know, then it was her responsibility and obligation as National Security Advisor to know.

COVER SHEET FOR PORTIONS OF THE JICI REPORT REGARDING
THE USE OF AIRCRAFT AS WEAPONS

In February 2002, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to conduct a joint inquiry into the activities of the U.S. intelligence community in connection with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. During the course of the inquiry, the committees held nine public hearings as well as thirteen closed sessions. In addition, the joint inquiry staff reviewed almost 500,000 pages of documents from the intelligence community agencies and other sources. The staff also conducted approximately 300 interviews, and participated in numerous briefings and panel discussions, that have involved almost 600 individuals from the intelligence community agencies, other U.S. Government organizations, state and local entities, and representatives of the private sector and foreign governments.

On December 20, 2002, the committees filed their final report, entitled "Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001" (the "JICI Report"). One part of that report discussed the pre-9/11 intelligence information on the use of aircraft as weapons. Attached hereto, is a copy of portions of the declassified JICI Report discussing that matter. Specifically, the following pages, some excerpted, are attached: 1, 9-10 and 209-215.



4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat.

Discussion: [While the credibility of the sources was sometimes questionable and the information often sketchy, the Inquiry confirmed that the Intelligence Community did receive intelligence reporting concerning the potential use of aircraft as weapons. For example, the Community received information in 1998 about a Bin Ladin operation that would involve flying an explosive- laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and, in summer 2001, about a plot to bomb a U.S. embassy from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. The FBI and CIA were also aware that convicted terrorist Abdul Hakim Murad and several others had discussed the possibility of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters as part of "the Bojinka Plot" in the Philippines, discussed later in this report. Some, but

~~TOP SECRET~~

apparently not all, of these reports were disseminated within the Intelligence Community and to other agencies].

The Transportation Security Administration, for example, advised the Committees that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had not received three of these reports, that two others were received by the FAA but through State Department cables, and that one report was received by the FAA, but only after September 11, 2001. Many policymakers and U.S. Government officials apparently remained unaware of this kind of potential threat and the Intelligence Community did not produce any specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would in fact use airplanes as weapons. For example, former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified before these Committees that:

I don't recall being presented with any specific threat information about an attack of this nature [the use of aircraft as weapons] or any alert highlighting this threat or indicating it was any more likely than any other.

That testimony is consistent with the views publicly expressed by the current National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, shortly after the September 11 attacks.

Similarly, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified that he had not been made aware of this type of potential threat:

I don't recall any warning of the possibility of a mass casualty attack using civilian airliners or any information that would have led us to contemplate the possibility of our shooting down a civilian airliner.

Even within the Intelligence Community, the possibility of using aircraft as weapons was apparently not widely known. At the FBI, for instance, the FBI Phoenix field office agent who wrote the so-called "Phoenix memo" testified that he was aware of the plot to crash a plane into CIA Headquarters, but not the other reports of terrorist groups considering the use of aircraft as weapons. The Chief of the Radical Fundamental Unit in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division also confirmed, in a Joint Inquiry interview, that he was not aware of such reports.

CNN

September 18, 2001

Maria Ressa: CNN Correspondent

MANILA, Philippines (CNN) - The FBI was warned six years ago [1995] of a terrorist plot to hijack commercial planes and slam them into the Pentagon, the CIA headquarters and other buildings, Philippine investigators told CNN. Philippine authorities learned of the plot after a small fire in a Manila apartment, which turned out to be the hideout of Ramzi Yousef, who was later convicted for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Yousef escaped at the time, but agents caught his right-hand man, Abdul Hakim Murad, who told them a chilling tale. "Murad narrated to us about a plan by the Ramzi cell in the continental U.S. to hijack a commercial plane and ram it into the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and also the Pentagon," said Rodolfo Mendoza, a Philippine intelligence investigator.

Philippine investigators also found evidence targeting commercial towers in San Francisco, Chicago and New York City. They said they passed that information on to the FBI in 1995, but it's not clear what was done with it. One week ago, [September 2001] two hijacked commercial jets slammed into the World Trade Center, collapsing the towers. Another jet hit the Pentagon and a fourth crashed in rural Pennsylvania. Authorities believe that fourth jet may have been headed for the Capitol or the White House. Thousands were killed in the attacks. On Monday, FBI Director Robert Mueller insisted the agency had "no warning signs" of last week's attacks.

REUTERS

Congress Eyes Reaction to Pre-September 11 Warnings

Steve Holand: May 16, 2002

WASHINGTON - Members of Congress raised questions on Thursday as to whether the Bush Administration should have reacted better to warnings in August that Usama bin Laden's followers might hijack U.S. passenger planes. North Carolina Democratic Sen. John Edwards said on ABC's "Good Morning America" there were three "enormous red flags" that should have sent alarm bells ringing. Alabama Republican Sen. Richard Shelby, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said he was troubled that the White House waited eight months to make the disclosure. "There was a lot of information. I believe and others believe if it had been acted upon properly we may have had a different situation on Sept. 11, we don't know that," he said on *NBC's Today* show. The White House revealed on Wednesday night that President Bush was briefed on U.S. intelligence in August, while at his Crawford, Texas, ranch, that bin Laden's network might hijack U.S. passenger planes. But the White House insisted Bush received no information to suggest that bin Laden's al-Qa'ida network planned to use airplanes as missiles as they did to attack the Pentagon and destroy the World Trade Center. "Until the attack took place, I think it's fair to say that no one envisioned that as a possibility," White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said Wednesday. The disclosure came amid questions about whether U.S. authorities failed to recognize and respond to warnings

about possible terrorist attacks before the hijackings of the four passenger planes on Sept. 11.

Members of Congress were asking some tough questions, pointing to three pre-Sept. 11 warning signs: The U.S. intelligence Bush received, the fact that an FBI agent had written a memo urging FBI headquarters to investigate Middle Eastern men enrolled in American flight schools, and the arrest in Minnesota of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was believed to be training for a suicide hijacking. “We’ve got terrorists connected to al-Qa’ida out in Arizona engaging in flight training, we’ve got Moussaoui arrested and being interrogated in Minnesota, we’ve got the president being briefed while he was on vacation in Texas about the possibility of these airplanes being hijacked. I mean, was anything done about any of those things?” Edwards said.

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ²⁹

Still quoting from the JICI Report, in January 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information concerning a planned suicide attack by persons associated with Shaykh al-Rahman and a key al-Qa’ida operative to fly to the U.S. from Afghanistan and attack the White House. Furthermore, in 1997, an FBI Headquarters unit became concerned about the possibility that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) would be used in terrorist attacks. The FBI and CIA became aware of reports that a group had purchased a UAV and concluded that the group might use the plane for reconnaissance or attack. The possibility of an attack outside the United States was thought to be more likely, for example, by flying a UAV into a U.S. embassy or a U.S. delegation.

Again, in August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a group, since linked to al-Qa’ida, planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The FAA found the plot to be highly unlikely given the state of the foreign country’s aviation program. Moreover, the agencies concluded that a flight originating outside the United States would be detected before it reached its target. The FBI’s New York office took no action on the information.

In September 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that bin Laden’s next operation might involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it. This information was provided to senior government officials in late 1998.

²⁹ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, DCI Tenet mentioned additional evidence developed since September 11 concerning al-Qa'ida's intention of to use airplanes as weapons:

[After 11 September, we learned from a foreign government service that in 1996, Bin Ladin's second-in-command, Muhammad Atif, drew up a study on the feasibility of hijacking US planes and destroying them in flight, possibly influenced by Yousef's and Mukhtar's unrealized plans [the Bojinka Plot]. . . . Bin Ladin's determination to strike America at home increased with the issuance of the February 1998 *fatwa* targeting all Americans, both military and civilian. The ideas about destroying commercial airliners that had been circulating in al-Qa'ida leadership circles for several years appear to have been revived after that *fatwa*, in the early planning stages of the 9/11 plot. We believe that outside events also shaped al-Qa'ida leaders' thinking about an airliner attack. [—————] the October 1999 crash of Egypt Air Flight 990, attributed in the media to a suicidal pilot, may have encouraged al-Qa'ida's growing impression that air travel was a vulnerability for the United States].

Despite these reports, the Intelligence Community did not produce any specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would use airplanes as weapons, and U.S. policymakers apparently remained unaware of this kind of potential threat. Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified before the Joint Inquiry: "We heard of the idea of airplanes as weapons, but I don't recall being presented with any specific threat information about an attack of this nature or any alert highlighting this [page 223] threat or indicating it was any more likely than any other." In response to written Joint Inquiry questions, Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley asserted:

* As noted earlier, however, the former intelligence office at FAA, the Transportation Security Intelligence Service, researched 12 reports concerning the possible use of airplanes as weapons that the DCI testified had been disseminated to appropriate agencies and found that there was no record of FAA receipt of three of them, two others had been derived from State Department reports, and one was not received by FAA until after September 11, 2001.

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TOP SECRET

Extract from the JICI Report

The JICI Report concludes by saying that as a result of the increasing threats to aviation, Congress required the FAA and FBI to conduct joint threat and vulnerability assessments of security at select "high risk" U.S. airports and to provide annual reports to Congress. A classified portion of the December 2000 report downplayed the threat to domestic aviation:

FBI investigations confirm domestic and international terrorist groups operating within the U.S. but do not suggest evidence of plans to target domestic civil aviation. Terrorist activity within the U.S. has focused primarily on fundraising, recruiting new members, and disseminating propaganda. While international terrorists have conducted attacks on U.S. soil, these acts represent anomalies in their traditional targeting which focuses on U.S. interests overseas.

The report further states that less than a year before the September 11 attacks, and notwithstanding intelligence information to the contrary, the FBI and FAA assessed the prospects of a terrorist incident targeting domestic civil aviation in the United States as **relatively low**. After September 11, the CIA acknowledged some of the information that was available regarding the use of airplanes as weapons. A draft analysis dated November 19, 2001, "The 11 September Attacks: A Preliminary Assessment," explains:

We do not know the process by which bin Laden and his lieutenants decided to hijack planes with the idea of flying them into buildings in the United States, but the idea of hijacking planes for suicide attacks had long been current in jihadist circles. For example, GIA terrorists from Algeria had planned to crash an Air France jet into the Eiffel Tower in December 1994, and Ramzi Yousef, a participant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, planned to explode 12 U.S. jetliners in mid-air over the Pacific in the mid-1990's. Likewise the World Trade Center had long been a target of terrorist bombers.

Despite that intelligence, the Joint Inquiry found no evidence that, before September 11, analysts in the Intelligence Community were:

- Cataloguing information regarding the use of airplanes as weapons as a terrorist tactic
- Sending requirements to collectors to look for additional information on this threat or considering the likelihood that bin Laden, al-Qa'ida, or any other terrorist group, would attack the United States or U.S. interests in this way

The CTC's Deputy Director acknowledged that the CIA had not performed strategic analysis on airplanes as weapons before September 11. He also explained ways in which CTC has sought to improve its analytic capabilities since then:

We have a couple of approaches to strategic analysis in CTC now. We have spent a fair amount of analytic time looking at intelligence reporting that [al-Qa'ida is] going to use a particular type of tactic or go after a particular type of target, other intelligence reporting that shows that they have actually trained at that tactic or trained for that type of target. When you get all three of those ingredients, that's pretty sobering. What is most alarming to us is the number of tactics that we've gotten that kind of a case on, that three-legged case, on surface-to-air missiles, use of truck bombs and car bombs, the use of aircraft, both aircraft hijackings and aircraft as weapons, the use of improvised explosive devices like Mr. Reid put in his shoes several months ago, the use of poisons and toxins. Put it all together and you can say that al-Qa'ida has built a handful of cards, any of which it could be playing, all of which it intends at some point and with some opportunity to play. Its choices are very broad and very frightening.

Even if enough analysis is done to provide better analysis to policymakers regarding strategic threats, there remains the issue of how much influence that information will have in warning other federal entities and the private sector. In discussing what could have been done better before September 11, the DCI told the Joint Inquiry that the failure to focus on the use of

airplanes as weapons was just one area that should have been part of a “systematic thought process to think about how you play defense.”

It is peculiar the DCI did not have the knowledge of 22 War Games which were being executed on the day of the attacks. Table of these is given below. If they did have this knowledge, they did not show this.

As to finalize what the report noted, they argue that “You can disseminate all of the threat reporting you want. You can do the strategic analysis about airplanes. You can do the strategic analysis about car bombs, truck bombs, assassination attempts, fast boats and everything else. You can put all of that out there to people. Unless somebody is thinking about the homeland from the perspective of buttoning it down to basically create a deterrence that may work, your assumption will be that the FBI and the CIA are going to be one-hundred percent flawless all of the time. And it will never happen.”

Military War Games of Global Guardian

War Game Definition: A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.

—*Dictionary of Military & Associated Terms*
(U.S. Department of Defense 2005)

2000	War-game	Type of drill	Operating from	Body/Agency
Apr. 19	VO-OO	Crop duster chemical incident	Holloman	WADS/NORAD
Oct. 24-26	Pentagon MASCAL	Hijack scenario on U.S. soil	Pentagon	Pentagon
Dec 1-4	Northern Denial	Russian exercise		NORAD

2001	War-game	Type of drill	Operating from	Body/Agency
Jan	Timely Alert	Chemical attack on U.S. soil	Fort Monmouth Army Base, NJ	
June 1-2	Amalgam Virgo 01	Cruise-missile defense	Tyndall Air Force Base	CINCNORAD
Sept. 11	Amalgam Warrior	Air defense/intercept against foreign retaliation	No details	NORAD
	FBI/CIA Anti-Terrorist Task Force	Anti-terrorist operations	Monterey, California	FBI/CIA
	AWACS	Two AWACS aircraft (Tinker AFB, Oklahoma) sent over DC + Florida; surveillance during president coup	No details	NORAD
	Apollo Guardian	Space Command	No details	STRATCOM
	Crown Vigilance	Air Combat Command	No details	No details
	Able Danger / Able Warrior	Anti-terrorism drill	No details	SOCOM
	NRO/CIA	Hijack scenario in U.S.	National Reconnaissance Office	CIA
	Computer Network Attack	Computer attack drill	Offutt Air Force Base Omaha, Nebraska	US STRATCOM ¹
	Northern Guardian	Hijack scenario in U.S.	Keflavik AFB, Iceland	NORAD
	Northern Vigilance	Russian Air Force	Cheyenne Mountain AFS, Colorado	NORAD
	Operation Southern Watch	174th Fighter Wing (NY) Air National Guard deploys to Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia		
	Operation Northern Watch	Fighters (Langley AFB) to Turkey		
	Red Flag	Diverts F-15s of 71st Fighter Squadron, Langley AFB, VA; DC ANG's 121st Fighter Squadron of Andrews Air Force Base also depleted	Nellis AFB, Nevada	
	Vigilant Guardian 01	Hijack scenario London to Cairo using "injects"	Cheyenne Mountain AFS, Colorado	NORAD

¹ In a 1998 defense department newsletter is a report how for several years, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) had been incorporating a Computer Network Attack (CNA) into Global Guardian.

2001	War-game	Type of drill	Operating from	Body/Agency
	Vigilant Warrior	Ref: Richard Clarke	Ref: Richard Clarke	NORAD/JCS
	No details	British Navy exercise	Indian Ocean	
	No details	Firemen training	Fort Meyer VA Ed. Ctr	Pentagon
	No details	WTC Emergency	Fiduciary Trust Co., 97th floor, WTC2	
	Timely Alert II	Chemical attack on U.S. soil	Fort Monmouth Army Base, New Jersey	
Sept. 12	TriPOD I	Biological war drill on U.S. soil	World Trade Center NY	FEMA
Sept. 12	TriPOD II	Biological war drill on U.S. soil	World Trade Center NY	FEMA
May 21	RED Ex	Chemical attack on U.S. soil	Pier 92 New York	FEMA

Special thanks to Mr. Tarpley for additional information on the given War Games conducted around and during the September 11, 2001, attacks. Through his research, an additional 3 games (totaling 22) is now known to have been operational on that fatal day.

In addition, from September 1st to the 10th of 2001, Operation “Swift Sword” was being implemented: Deploying 25,000 British troops to Oman; two U.S. carrier battle groups arriving on station in the Gulf of Arabia just off the Pakistani coast; and, 17,000 U.S. troops joining more than 23,000 NATO troops in Egypt for operation “Bright Star.” ²

The purpose for all these War Games on September 11 was due to the National Special Security Event, which was going on at the United Nations in New York.

² Sources: *The Guardian*, *CNN*, *Fox*, *The Observer*.

WND

Official: Kerry failed to act on pre-9/11 tip 3rd agent to say he warned security lapses made Boston airport ripe for "jihad" attack

Paul Sperry: March 19, 2004

WASHINGTON - A third federal aviation-security agent, one still with the government, has stepped forward to say he also warned Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry about security lapses at Boston's Logan International Airport before the 9/11 hijackings there. Earlier this week, two former FAA agents said the Democratic presidential hopeful failed to take effective action after they gave him a prophetic warning that his home airport was vulnerable to multiple hijackings.

Brian Sullivan, a retired special agent from the Boston area, advised Kerry in a May 7, 2001, letter that Logan was ripe for a "jihad" suicide operation possibly involving "a coordinated attack." He cited serious breaches at Logan security checkpoints exposed by an undercover investigation he and another former agent helped a Boston TV news station conduct. Sullivan says he had a copy of the undercover videotape hand-delivered to Kerry's office. It turns out the person who delivered it was a senior FAA agent in Washington who's now with the Transportation Security Administration. The agent, Bogdan Dzakovic, headed covert testing of airport security across the country before TSA took over aviation security from FAA after 9-11.

Washington, D.C., 14 October 2004: The Transportation Security Administration this week refused to release the texts or even the titles of five aviation warnings given to airlines just before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, even though the titles and substance of the warnings have been published in the best-selling 9/11 Commission report, according to an analysis of the documents posted today on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The five warnings (called Information Circulars) were sent to the civil air industry by the Federal Aviation Administration to summarize emerging threats between June 22, 2001, and August 16, 2001. The 9/11 Commission, the Congressional 9/11 Joint Inquiry, and White House briefings described and discussed these warnings in detail; and the National Security Archive filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for them in April 2004.

By letter dated September 29, 2004, and received by the Archive this week, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) withheld all the substance of the warnings, citing five different exemptions to the FOIA, and blacked out even the unclassified information, such as the document titles and numbers, claiming that this information fits in the new category of "Sensitive Security Information."

"This ranks as a dubious secret," said Barbara Elias, the FOIA coordinator at the National Security Archive. "The titles and document numbers are printed in the number one best-selling book in the country, but clearly our government has not acted on a central recommendation of that book, to reduce secrecy and share more information with the public. Public circulation of warnings like these would make our country safer," said Thomas Blanton, the National Security Archive director. "The government is choosing to hide our

vulnerabilities rather than fix them.” The National Security Archive has posted on its Website a side-by-side comparison of the information withheld by the TSA and citations of the same information in public documents such as the 9/11 Commission Report. A recurrent theme throughout the 9/11 Commission’s report is the need to prevent widespread over classification by the U.S. federal government. The Commission found over classification interferes with sharing critical information and impedes efficient responses to threats. The TSA’s recent refusal to release its more than three-year-old Information Circulars and its decision to block the release of even the publicly-known parts of these documents serve to remind the public that the information-sharing recommendations of the 9/11 Commission have yet to be put into practice.

WASHINGTON POST

The News That Didn’t Fit To Print in the N.Y. Times

No Room for Terror

Howard Kurtz

June 10, 2002

Nearly a month before Sept. 11, terrorism analyst Peter Bergen told a *New York Times* reporter that he should write about an al-Qa’ida propaganda videotape that Bergen had obtained. “I think there is a major story to be told,” he wrote to *Times* reporter John Burns, “wrapping around the new bin Laden videotape and the various threats against U.S. facilities in the past months which can paint both a compelling picture of the bin Laden organization today, and responsibly suggest that an al-Qa’ida attack is in the works. Clearly, al-Qa’ida was and is planning something.” Burns, a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, wrote an article that appeared on the *Times*’s Website Sept. 8. But Burns’s prescient piece about Usama bin Laden never appeared in the newspaper, and the *Times* quickly expunged it from the electronic archives.

Burns says from London that the piece was held for space reasons. “There was never any substantive problem with the story,” he says. “It was, of course, unfortunate that it worked out in the way it did. If the events of September 11 had not been of such catastrophic magnitude, I might have been a lot more chagrined than I was. My personal disappointment became utterly irrelevant. It would be pretty self-indulgent of me to say I was denied a journalistic coup because of this.” Bergen, who recounts the episode in the paperback edition of his book *Holy War, Inc.*, says the *Times*’s decision to hold the story (in which he was quoted) “is symptomatic of many American institutions’ failure to fully appreciate the scope of the threat posed by al-Qa’ida.”

Bernard Gwertzman, editor of www.Nytimes.com, calls the incident “a bad screw-up.” He says the Burns piece was scheduled for publication Sept. 9, a Sunday, and that the website routinely posts such stories on Saturday afternoon. After *Times* editors held the story late Saturday, Gwertzman says, “the paper called the next day and complained, and my day producer just pulled the story. The resulting problem was that people who’d seen the story then tried to search for it, and because it was expunged from our system, you couldn’t find

it.” He says the website “probably shouldn’t have pulled it off.” Snippets of the al-Qa’ida videotape had been shown on *CNN*, where Bergen is a terrorism consultant, and *Reuters* had carried a story.

REUTERS

Pilot Said to Boast of Murder Year Before 9/11

Adam Tanner

August 29, 2002

BERLIN (Reuters) - One of the kamikaze hijackers who destroyed the World Trade Center apparently boasted more than a year before the September 11 attack that his actions would kill thousands, Germany’s public prosecutor said on Thursday. Prosecutor General Kay Nehm gave details of the warning after charging an alleged conspirator, Mounir El Motassadeq, with serving as a terrorist accomplice in the murder of more than 3,000 people in the New York attack. Nehm told how hijacker Marwan Al Shehhi, who piloted the second plane into the WTC, told a Hamburg librarian in April or May 2000: “There will be thousands of dead, you will think of me. In addition the words ‘World Trade Center’ were mentioned,” Nehm said.

Shehhi’s warning in the port city of Hamburg appears to be a rare breach of security for an extraordinarily secretive group. Those who knew the hijackers there have described them as polite, hard-working students who gave no clues that they would commit the world’s deadliest peacetime attack. The prosecutor told reporters Motassadeq and Shehhi were part of a group of seven radical Islamists who came together in the 1990s in Hamburg. Of those, only Motassadeq, 28, a former electrical engineering student, has been charged. Three were pilots killed in the attacks and the others are still at large.

“The charges are suspicion of membership in a terrorist group and aiding and abetting murder in more than 3,000 cases,” Nehm said. “He is accused of being a member of the Hamburg cell that supported the four terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.” Motassadeq was arrested in Hamburg in late November. It is the first time he has been formally charged. “Motassadeq was a cog without which the thing would not have worked,” Nehm said.

**Fair Use:* For more information see footnote. ¹

“The bottom line is that a number of NSA personnel who were on duty in the months leading up to 9/11, the day of the attacks, and subsequent weeks and months, are aware of undeniable facts that point to a massive cover-up by the Bush-Cheney administration of the circumstances surrounding 9/11, including what actually befell United Airlines flight 93 and who was issuing direct military orders from the White House. The Obama administration, rather than lessen the pressure on the NSA personnel, has turned up the

¹ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

heat and is resorting to even more draconian methods to ensure silence. The word from inside NSA is that a state of fear exists.”

—Wayne Madsen
(Former U.S. Navy Intelligence Officer)

According to an NSA Employee Manual, the handbook is designed to introduce its employees “to some of the basic security principles and procedures with which all NSA employees must comply.” The manual highlights some of the security responsibilities, and provides guidelines for answering questions the employees may be asked concerning their association with this agency. Philip T. Pease, the Director of Security at NSA, notes in the Introduction of the manual to the employees:

“In joining NSA you have been given an opportunity to participate in the activities of one of the most important intelligence organizations of the United States Government. At the same time, you have also assumed a trust which carries with it a most important individual responsibility: The safeguarding of sensitive information vital to the security of our nation. While it is impossible to estimate in actual dollars and cents the value of the work being conducted by this agency, the information to which you will have access at NSA is without question critically important to the defense of the United States. Since this information may be useful only if it is kept secret, it requires a very special measure of protection. The specific nature of this protection is set forth in various agency security regulations and directives. The total NSA Security Program, however, extends beyond these regulations. It is based upon the concept that security begins as a state of mind. The program is designed to develop an appreciation of the need to protect information vital to the national defense, and to foster the development of a level of awareness which will make security more than routine compliance with regulations.”

Since information “may be useful only if it is kept secret,” and “it requires a very special measure of protection,” as Pease notes, there is little doubt any inside information, pertaining to 9/11, will ever be set free from the cobwebs of secrecy. “Weaving spiders come not here,” is an understatement. There is a time-honoured tradition of smearing the accuser rather than answering the charge. That method is apparent in all agencies of the 9/11 handlers, and while it may be a familiar way of doing business, it is no less disappointing. Here are a few more points from the NSA manual.

- Anonymity means that NSA personnel are encouraged not to draw attention to themselves nor to their association with this agency
- NSA personnel are also cautioned neither to confirm nor deny any specific questions about NSA activities directed to them by individuals not affiliated with the agency
- Should strangers or casual acquaintances question you about your place of employment, an appropriate reply would be that you work for the Department of Defense

- If you are asked about the activities of NSA, the best response is ‘no comment.’ You should then notify Q43 of the attempted inquiry
- For the most part, public references to NSA are based upon educated guesses. The agency does not normally make a practice of issuing public statements about its activities

Under the chapter “Espionage and Terrorism” this is what the manual says:

During your security indoctrination and throughout your NSA career you will become increasingly aware of the espionage and terrorist threat to the United States. Your vigilance is the best single defense in protecting NSA information, operations, facilities and people. Any information that comes to your attention that suggests to you the existence of, or potential for, espionage or terrorism against the U.S. or its allies must be promptly reported by you to the Office of Security. There should be no doubt in your mind about the reality of the threats. You are now affiliated with the most sensitive agency in government and are expected to exercise vigilance and common sense to protect NSA against these threats.

Keeping this strict rule in mind, it is peculiar how the CIA/NSA did not feel the warnings prior 9/11 were threatening enough to trigger a full-scale investigation in order those warnings create no doubt in their mind “about the reality of the threats.” But this is what they told the public; it does not mean they did not investigate, and the result of those investigations could not be made public, due to the circumstances and person(s) involved.

The following extract comes from the “Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States” report and from the testimony of Peter Lance taken March 15, 2004, at the Commission offices 26 Federal Plaza New York, N.Y. before Dietrich Snell, senior counsel and Marco Cordero investigator:

The intelligence spikes suggesting an attack by airliners were so numerous by July 6, 2001, that Richard Clark, the terrorism “czar” under President’s Clinton and George W. Bush called a White House meeting with officials from the FBI, FAA, Coast Guard, Secret Services and INS warning that “something really spectacular is going to happen here and it’s going to happen soon.” The next day Clarke chaired a meeting of the National Security Council’s Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) and ordered a suspension of all non-essential travel by the staff. On July 19 Attorney General Ashcroft left on a trip to his home state of Missouri aboard a private jet. When asked by reporters when he didn’t us a commercial jet as was customary, he cited the Department of Justice, what it called a “threat assessment” by the FBI. The Attorney General, they said, had been advised to travel only by private jet for the rest of his term.

NEW YORK TIMES

A Nation Challenged: The Conspiracy; 2 Leaders Tell Of Plot to Kill Bush in Genoa

David E. Sanger

September 26, 2001 ²

The president of Egypt and the deputy prime minister of Italy say that Usama bin Laden's network of Islamic terrorists threatened to kill President Bush and other leaders of the industrialized world when they met at a summit meeting in Genoa last July. The White House, in line with longstanding policy not to discuss threats on the president, declined to comment today. In an interview on French television on Monday, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt spoke in specific terms about the threat, saying that "on June 13 of this year, [2001] we learned of a communiqué from bin Laden saying he wanted to assassinate George W. Bush and other G8 heads of state during their summit in Italy. It was a well-known piece of information," Mr. Mubarak added in the interview broadcast by the network France 3. Separately, he told "Le Figaro," a major French daily newspaper, that Egyptian intelligence services had told the United States about the threat and that the warning included a reference to "an airplane stuffed with explosives." Several days before Mr. Mubarak's interview, in an appearance on Italian television, Gianfranco Fini, the Italian deputy prime minister, discussed parallels between the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, and warnings his government had received before the Genoa meeting in July.

"Many people joked about the Italian Intelligence Force," Mr. Fini said, "but actually they had information that in Genoa there was the hypothesis of an attack on the American president with the use of an airplane. That is why we closed the airspace above Genoa and installed anti-aircraft missiles. Those who joked should now reflect."

The senior American security official said the source of warnings from foreign intelligence agencies was often unclear, and the volume was so great that serious threats were frequently difficult to separate from false alarms. A senior administration official, who could not confirm the accounts, said that foreign intelligence agencies frequently received tips about threats to the president that they passed on to Washington.

While there was a general concern about Mr. bin Laden before the July conference in Italy, there had also been concerns about Islamic extremists at other summit meetings, including the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Brunei last year, attended by President Clinton.

There was no attack in Genoa. It was marked chiefly by violent protests in the streets by anarchists and anticapitalist demonstrators that resulted in many injuries and the death of one protester at the hands of the Italian police. But participants and reporters who flew into the Christopher Columbus airport, which was closed to commercial traffic, were greeted by

² [<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/26/world/a-nation-challenged-the-conspiracy-2-leaders-tell-of-plot-to-kill-bush-in-genoa.html>]

the unusual sight of anti-aircraft batteries along the runways. One senior American official who has been involved in a number of such summit conferences said today, "It's something I have never seen before, especially in such an obvious spot."

Since the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington, European and American officials have been reviewing threats from Mr. bin Laden's organization in June and July. Those threats resulted in a number of public warnings around the July 4 holiday, and extra security precautions for Mr. Bush. But after nothing materialized, the concern waned. The most specific warning that Mr. bin Laden planned an attack apparently came from Egyptian intelligence sources. In his interview with *Le Figaro*, published late last week, Mr. Mubarak said: "We had communicated to the Americans certain information from the video made by bin Laden on the 13th of June. It spoke of assassinating President Bush and other heads of state in Rome. It was a question of an airplane stuffed with explosives. These precautions then had been taken." However, people who have viewed the tape say there is no reference on it to any airplane stuffed with explosives, no specific threat to kill the President, and no mention of an attack by aircraft. President Mubarak added that "no one had imagined that Boeings filled with passengers would be crashed against the buildings." Italian officials say that the anti-aircraft batteries they set up in Genoa were primarily intended to deter an attack from a small plane.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

May 21, 2002

Traces Of Terror:

The FBI Memo; Ashcroft Learned Of Agent's Alert Just After 9/11

David Johnston & Don Van Natta Jr.

WASHINGTON - Attorney General John Ashcroft and the FBI Director, Robert S. Mueller III, were told a few days after the Sept. 11 attacks that the FBI had received a memorandum from its Phoenix office the previous July warning that Usama bin Laden's followers could be training at American flight schools, government officials said today. But senior Bush administration officials said neither Mr. Ashcroft nor Mr. Mueller briefed President Bush and his national security staff until recently about the Phoenix memorandum. Nor did they tell Congressional leaders. The disclosure is certain to magnify criticism of the FBI's performance, including its failure to act on the memorandum before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The two men have not said publicly when they learned of the July 10 memorandum, but the officials said that within days of the attacks senior law enforcement officials grasped the document's significance as a potentially important missed signal.

Today, several FBI and Justice Department officials said that in the chaotic days after the attacks, discussions between Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Mueller were hurried and that their recollection of events were somewhat blurred by the frenetic pace of activity. Some officials said they recalled high-level discussions about how the hijackers had attended American flight schools, but one Justice Department official did not recall a briefing about the memorandum. Spokesmen for Mr. Mueller and Mr. Ashcroft would not discuss the issue today. A senior

Justice Department official said, “The Attorney General was not briefed in any detail or with any specificity about the document known as the Phoenix memo until about a month ago.”

Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, who was traveling today with the president in Miami, said, “We have nothing that indicates the president had seen or even heard about this memo prior to a few weeks ago.” Mr. Bush’s national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, said last Thursday that the president had not heard about the memorandum before the hijackings and had only recently learned of it. “I personally became aware of it just recently,” Ms. Rice said, adding that she had asked Mueller and George J. Tenet, the Director of central intelligence, to review the matter.

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ³

“The simple fact of September 11 is this,” Attorney General John Ashcroft testified before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States in April 13, 2004, “we did not know an attack was coming because for nearly a decade our government had blinded itself to its enemies. Our agents were isolated by government-imposed walls, handcuffed by government-imposed restrictions, and starved for basic information technology. The old national intelligence system in place on September 11 was destined to fail.”

Ashcroft further noted that hijackers conducted a multi-prong terrorist attack on the U.S. in September 11 which was supported by a “significant” number of associates. Federal agents pursued more than 2,000 leads into the case, “interviewing any number of people across the country. Some people were detained due to irregularities in their immigration status,” he noted. Accompanied by the newly installed director of the FBI Robert Mueller in the briefing, Ashcroft said federal agents from the Departments of Justice and Treasury, the U.S. Marshals Service, Border Patrol and U.S. Customs were all being called in to enhance security at U.S. airports. He also said the Justice Department would work to speed the delivery of benefits to survivors of police and rescue personnel killed in the line of duty in the aftermath of the attacks.

The Aviation Security System and the “9/11 Attacks Staff Statement No. 3,” organized an investigation “on how the individuals who carried out the 9/11 attacks defeated the civil aviation security system of the United States.” Their investigative work was conducted by various agencies, including the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The report follows.

Aviation Security System and the 9/11 Attacks Staff Statement No. 3

Before September 11, 2001, the aviation security system had been enjoying a period of relative peace. No U.S. flagged aircraft had been bombed or hijacked in over a decade.

³ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

Domestic hijacking in particular seemed like a thing of the past, something that could only happen to foreign airlines that were less well protected. The public's own "threat assessment" before September 11 was sanguine about commercial aviation safety and security. In a Fox News/Opinion Dynamics survey conducted at the end of the 1990s, 78% cited poor maintenance as "a greater threat to airline safety" than terrorism. Demand for air service was strong and was beginning to exceed the capacity of the system. Heeding constituent calls for improved air service and increased capacity, Congress focused its legislative and oversight attention on measures to address these problems, including a "passenger bill of rights" to assure a more efficient and convenient passenger experience.

The leadership of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also focused on safety, customer service, capacity and economic issues. The agency's security agenda was focused on efforts to implement a three-year-old Congressional mandate to deploy explosives detection equipment at all major airports and complete a nearly five-year-old rulemaking effort to improve checkpoint screening. This staff statement will not address certain security performance issues leading up to 9/11 at the airports from which the hijacked planes departed. Such work is still ongoing.

It should be noted that the airports themselves did not have operational or enforcement jurisdiction over checkpoint screening operations. Passenger pre-screening and checkpoint screening, based on regulations from the FAA, were the responsibility of the air carriers. Nevertheless, airport authorities do play a key role in the overall civil aviation security system.

Before September 11, federal law required the FAA to set and enforce aviation security policies and regulations that would "protect passengers and property on an aircraft operating in air transportation or intra-state air transportation against an act of criminal violence or aircraft piracy." The layered system, one that recognized that no single security measure was flawless or impenetrable, was designed to provide a greater number of opportunities to foil those intending to do such violence. The Civil Aviation Security system in place on September 11 was composed of seven layers of defense including:

1. Intelligence
2. Passenger prescreening
3. Airport access control
4. Passenger checkpoint screening
5. Passenger checked baggage screening
6. Cargo screening
7. On-board security

The above security system no longer exists. We will document serious shortcomings in that system's design and implementation that made the 9/11 hijackings possible. We want to make clear that our findings of specific vulnerabilities and shortcomings do not necessarily apply to the current system. Two of the layers of defense: Checked baggage screening and

cargo security, are not relevant to the 9/11 plot. They are not addressed in this statement. A third layer, airport access control, is still under investigation and also will not be addressed in detail. Compelling evidence, including videotape of hijackers entering through checkpoint screening stations, suggests that the hijackers gained access to the aircraft on September 11 through passenger checkpoints. What we do know is that the hijackers successfully evaded or defeated the remaining four layers of the security system.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: That the alleged hijackers were captured on CCTV is not entirely true as the report states. When we investigated this area, we found that at least in two airports, CCTV were not operational; meaning, they were never installed according to airport officials. Furthermore, from September 9 to September 11, 2001, the check in boarding system was not operational. For two days, gate employees were writing all boarding passes by hand. And last, but not least which will be given in further detail in the airport security section we cover later in this work, the only coverage of CCTV regarding those to board Flight AA11 was coming from one airport and not two airports where the alleged hijackers had to change flight from Portland to Boston. Returning to the report, in section "The Enemy View" the following was stated:

We approach the question of how the aviation security system failed on September 11 by starting from the perspective of the enemy, asking, "What did al-Qa'ida have to do to complete its mission?" Some time during the late 1990s, the al-Qa'ida leadership made the decision to hijack large, commercial, multi-engine aircraft and use them as a devastating weapon as opposed to hijacking a commercial aircraft for use as a bargaining tool. To carry out that decision would require unique skill sets:

- Terrorists trained as pilots with the specialized skill and confidence to successfully fly large, multi-engine aircraft, already airborne, into selected targets
- Tactics, techniques, and procedures to successfully conduct in-flight hijackings
- Operatives willing to die

To our knowledge, 9/11 was the first time in history that terrorists actually piloted a commercial jetliner in a terrorist operation. This was new. This could not happen overnight and would require long term planning and sequenced operational training. The terrorists had to determine the tactics and techniques needed to succeed in hijacking an aircraft within the United States. The vulnerabilities of the U.S. domestic commercial aviation security system were well advertised through numerous unclassified reports from agencies like the General Accounting Office and the Department of Transportation's Inspector General. The news media had publicized those findings.

The al-Qa'ida leadership recognized the need for more specific information. Its agents observed the system first-hand and conducted surveillance flights both internationally and within the United States. Over time, this information allowed them to revise and refine the operational plan. By the spring of 2001, the September 11 operation had combined intent with capabilities to present a real and present threat to the civil aviation system. As long as

operational security was maintained, the plan had a high probability of success in conducting multiple, near simultaneous attacks on New York City and Washington, DC. Let us turn now to a more specific look at the security system in place on September 11 related to anti-hijacking.

The first layer of defense was intelligence. While the FAA was not a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the agency maintained a civil aviation intelligence division that operated 24 hours per day. The intelligence watch was the collection point for a flow of threat related information from federal agencies, particularly the FBI, CIA, and State Department. FAA intelligence personnel were assigned as liaisons to work within these three agencies to facilitate the flow of aviation related information to the FAA and to promote inter-departmental cooperation. The FAA did not assign liaisons to either the NSA or the Defense Intelligence Agency but maintained intelligence requirements with those agencies.

Intelligence data received by the FAA went into preparing Intelligence Case Files. These files tracked and assessed the significance of aviation security incidents, threats and emerging issues. The FAA's analysis of this data informed its security policies, including issuance of FAA Information Circulars, Security Directives, and Emergency Amendments. Such Security Directives and Emergency Amendments are how the FAA ordered air carriers and/or airports to undertake certain extraordinary security measures that were needed immediately above the established baseline. While the staff has not completed its review and analysis as to what the FAA knew about the threat posed by al-Qa'ida to civil aviation, including the potential use of aircraft as weapons, we can say:

First, no documentary evidence reviewed by the Commission or testimony we have received to this point has revealed that any level of the FAA possessed any credible and specific intelligence indicating that Usama bin Laden, al-Qa'ida affiliates or any other group were actually plotting to hijack commercial planes in the United States and use them as weapons of mass destruction.⁴

Second, the threat posed by Usama bin Laden, al-Qa'ida and affiliates, including their interest in civil aviation, was well known to key civil aviation security officials. The potential threat of Middle Eastern terrorist groups to civil aviation security was acknowledged in many different official FAA documents. The FAA possessed information claiming that associates with Usama bin Laden in the 1990s were interested in hijackings and the use of an aircraft as a weapon.

Third, the potential for terrorist suicide hijacking in the United States was officially considered by the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security dating back to at least March 1998. However in a presentation the agency made to air carriers and airports in 2000 and early 2001 the FAA discounted the threat because, "fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction." It wasn't until well after the 9/11 attacks that the FAA

⁴ This has turned out not to be true as we saw in the War Games section.

learned of the “Phoenix EC” an internal FBI memo written in July of 2001 by an FBI agent in the Phoenix field office, suggesting steps that should be taken by the Bureau to look more closely at civil aviation education schools around the country and the use of such programs by individuals who may be affiliated with terrorist organizations.

Fourth, the FAA was aware prior to September 11 of the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota, a man arrested by the INS in August 2001 following reports of suspicious behaviour in flight school and the determination that he had overstayed his visa waiver period. Several key issues remain regarding what the FAA knew about Moussaoui, when they knew it, and how they responded to the information supplied by the FBI, which we are continuing to pursue.

Fifth, the FAA did react to the heightened security threat identified by the Intelligence Community during the summer of 2001, including issuing alerts to air carriers about the potential for terrorist acts against civil aviation. In July 2001, the FAA alerted the aviation community to reports of possible near-term terrorist operations, particularly on the Arabian Peninsula and/or Israel.

The FAA informed the airports and air carriers that it had no credible evidence of specific plans to attack U.S. civil aviation. The agency said that some of the currently active groups were known to plan and train for hijackings and had the capability to construct sophisticated improvised explosive devices concealed inside luggage and consumer products. The FAA encouraged all U.S. Carriers to exercise prudence and demonstrate a high degree of alertness. Although several civil aviation security officials testified that the FAA felt blind when it came to assessing the domestic threat because of the lack of intelligence on what was going on in the American homeland as opposed to overseas, FAA security analysts did perceive an increasing terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation at home. FAA documents, including agency accounts published in the Federal Register on July 17, 2001, expressed the FAA’s understanding that terrorist groups were active in the United States and maintained an historic interest in targeting aviation, including hijacking.

While the agency was engaged in an effort to pass important new regulations to improve checkpoint screener performance, implement anti-sabotage measures, and conduct ongoing assessments of the system, no major increases in anti-hijacking security measures were implemented in response to the heightened threat levels in the spring and summer of 2001, other than general warnings to the industry to be more vigilant and cautious.

Sixth, the civil aviation security system in the United States during the summer of 2001 stood, as it had for quite some time, at an intermediate aviation security alert level, tantamount to a permanent Code Yellow. This level and its corresponding security measures, was required when: Information indicates that a terrorist group or other hostile entity with a known capability of attacking civil aviation is likely to carry out attacks against U.S. targets; or civil disturbances with a direct impact on civil aviation have begun or are imminent. Without actionable intelligence information to uncover and interdict a terrorist plot in the planning

stages or prior to the perpetrator gaining access to the aircraft in the lead-up to September 11, 2001, it was up to the other layers of aviation security to counter the threat.

We conclude this section with a final observation. The last major terrorist attack on a U.S. flagged airliner had been with smuggled explosives, in 1988, in the case of Pan Am 103. The famous Bojinka plot broken up in Manila in 1995 had principally been a plot to smuggle explosives on airliners. The Commission on Aviation Safety and Security created by President Clinton in 1996, named the Gore Commission for its chairman, the Vice President, had focused overwhelmingly on the danger of explosives on aircraft. Historically, explosives on aircraft had taken a heavy death toll, hijackings had not. So, despite continued foreign hijackings leading up to 9/11, the U.S. aviation security system worried most about explosives.

END OF REPORT

INDEPENDENT UK

Bush was given hijack warning by British intelligence. Americans were told of attack threat, say MI5 and MI6, as Marines begin new operation against al-Qa'ida

Andrew Gumbel & Jason Bennetto

18 May 2002

President Bush's CIA briefing last August [2001] about possible attacks on U.S. targets by al-Qa'ida, the focus of the current "what did he know and when did he know it" furore, was based on British intelligence reports, officials on both sides of the Atlantic said. Intelligence sources in London confirmed yesterday that both MI5 and MI6 had sent reports to the United States in the run-up to 11 September, suggesting that America was under threat. The reports did not mention a specific plan or method of attack, however, and speculated that the most likely targets were overseas American interests such as embassies or military bases. In Washington, meanwhile, government officials spoken to by *The New York Times* suggested Mr Bush's briefing on 6 August at his ranch in Texas was a rehash of 1998 intelligence data "drawn from a single British source."

Both the unnamed officials and Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Adviser, said the report contained speculation that Usama bin Laden's organization might be thinking of hijacking planes, but there was no hint that they might be used as weapons of mass destruction in a suicide mission. Ms Rice said in a news briefing on Thursday: "It [the report] mentioned hijacking, but hijacking in the traditional sense. The most important and most likely thing was that they would take over an airliner holding passengers and demand the release of one of their operatives."

U.S. law enforcement has repeatedly received word over the past few years of plans to try to spring Omar Abdel Rahman, the so-called "Blind Sheikh" from federal prison where he is serving a life sentence for his role in plotting a bomb attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993. It was not clear from Ms Rice's words whether he was the "operative" she was referring

to, but in any case she made clear that the speculation was based on long-standing thinking in the intelligence community, not new data. “It was an analytic report that talked about UBL’s [Mr bin Laden’s] methods of operations, talked about what he had done historically,” Ms Rice said. “I want to reiterate: It’s not a warning. There’s not specific time, place or method mentioned.”

Barring the emergence of documentary evidence contradicting the official line, and none has so far come to light, it seems hard to argue that Mr Bush was negligent in his handling of the information he received. According to Ms Rice’s account, there was a great deal of nervousness about terror attacks in the early part of last summer, but the focus was on preventing possible attacks on the G8 summit in Genoa. There was also specific concern about U.S. interests in Paris, Rome and Turkey, which has since been substantiated by the arrest of numerous suspected al-Qa’ida operatives believed to have been planning assaults on the U.S. embassies in France and Italy and an American military base in Turkey. The most damning evidence of negligence pre-11 September remains, for the moment, below White House level, with the FBI, the CIA and immigration officials, who had a tantalizing string of leads that they failed to follow up or pass on to their political masters.

WASHINGTON POST

At Camp David, Advise and Dissent Bush, Aides Grapple With War Plan

Bob Woodward & Dan Balz

Washington Post Staff Writers

Thursday, January 31, 2002

CIA Director George J. Tenet arrived at Camp David with a briefcase stuffed with top-secret documents and plans, in many respects the culmination of more than four years of work on Usama bin Laden, the al-Qa’ida network and worldwide terrorism. The briefing packet he handed to President Bush and other members of the war cabinet carried a cover sheet entitled “Going to War.” In the upper left corner was a picture of bin Laden inside a red circle. A red slash was superimposed over his face in the CIA’s adaptation of the universal symbol of warning and prohibition.

Bush had assembled his advisers in Laurel Lodge at the 125-acre presidential retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland for a day of intensive discussions about how to respond to the attacks of Sept. 11. They had been conferring regularly but mostly in short meetings. This session would give them a chance to talk at length without interruption and to revisit some of the questions they had been wrestling with the past four days. Tenet was just one of several advisers called on to offer ideas and options on a day designed more for deliberation and recommendations than presidential decision. But Tenet’s 30-minute presentation, an expanded version of what he had told Bush and the war cabinet on Sept. 13, sketched the architecture of what the president was looking for: A worldwide campaign on terrorism with an opening phase focused on bin Laden, al-Qa’ida and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Tenet brought with him a detailed master plan for covert war in Afghanistan and a top-secret “Worldwide Attack Matrix” outlining a clandestine anti-terror campaign in 80 countries around the world. What he was ready to propose represented a striking and risky departure for U.S. policy and would give the CIA the broadest and most lethal authority in its history. Another option discussed by Bush’s advisers during the week, a military campaign against Iraq, also would be considered at Camp David. But at a key moment, when asked by Bush, four of his five top advisers would recommend that Iraq not be included in an initial round of military strikes.

Seated around a large table in the wood-paneled conference room, Bush and his advisers were informally dressed, many wearing jackets because of the chilly temperatures that morning. Bush was flanked on his right by Vice President Cheney and his left by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, with Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld next to Powell. Bush had recorded his weekly radio address from the same cabin earlier in the day, and conferred with Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. At 09:19 a.m. he invited reporters into the conference room for a few questions. He was pointing toward war but deliberately circumspect about what he intended to do, and when. “This is an administration that will not talk about how we gather intelligence, how we know what we’re going to do, nor what our plans are,” he said. “When we move, we will communicate with you in an appropriate manner. We’re at war.”

Tenet with his professionally packaged briefing papers, flipped past the cover to the first page, which read, “Initial Hook: Destroying al-Qa’ida, Closing the safe haven.” The haven was Afghanistan. Then he went methodically, page by page, through the briefing material, providing for the president and the others the basic covert-action foundation for an unconventional war on terrorism. It would start with a half-dozen small CIA paramilitary teams on the ground in Afghanistan. They could eventually link up with military Special Forces units, who would bring firepower and technology to aid the opposition fighters in Afghanistan. The plan called for intelligence-sharing with other nations and a full-scale attack on the financial underpinnings of the terrorist network, plus covert operations across the globe.

At the heart of the proposal was a recommendation that the president give the CIA what Tenet labeled “exceptional authorities” to attack and destroy al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan and the rest of the world. Tenet wanted a broad, general intelligence order that would allow the CIA to conduct the necessary covert operations without having to come back for formal approval for each specific operation. Tenet said he needed the new authority to allow the agency to operate without restraint, and he wanted encouragement from the president to take risks.

Tenet had with him a draft of a presidential intelligence order that would give the CIA power to use the full range of covert instruments, including deadly force. For more than two decades, the CIA had simply modified previous presidential findings to obtain formally its authority for counterterrorism. Tenet’s new proposal, technically called a Memorandum of

Notification, was presented as a modification to the worldwide counterterrorism intelligence finding signed on May 12, 1986, by President Ronald Reagan. As if symbolically erasing the more recent past, it superseded five such memoranda signed by President Bill Clinton. Another proposal was that the CIA increase liaison work with key foreign intelligence services. Tenet hoped to obtain the assistance of these agencies with some of the hundreds of millions of dollars in new funding he was seeking. Using such intelligence services as surrogates could triple or quadruple the CIA's effectiveness.

Like much of the world of covert activity, these kinds of arrangements carried risks: It would put the United States in league with questionable agencies, some with dreadful human rights records. Some of these intelligence services had a reputation for ruthlessness and they used torture to obtain confessions. Tenet acknowledged that these were not people you were likely to be sitting next to in church on Sunday. Tenet also said the United States already had a "large asset base," given the work the CIA had been doing in countries near Afghanistan. The unmanned Predator surveillance aircraft that was now armed with Hellfire missiles had been operating for more than a year out of Uzbekistan to provide real-time video of Afghanistan. It could be used to kill bin Laden and his key lieutenants from the air: A major focus of what Tenet now proposed.

Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US



Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."

After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a [REDACTED] service.

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an [REDACTED] service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressaam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressaam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressaam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa'ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa'ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a [REDACTED] service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

continued

For the President Only
6 August 2001

[REDACTED]
Declassified and Approved
for Release, 10 April 2004

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- Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.

For the President Only
6 August 2001

Declassified and Approved
for Release, 10 April 2004

One of the documents CIA Director George J. Tenet took to Camp David

TIMES OF LONDON

Spy chiefs warned ministers of al-Qa'ida attacks

Michael Evans, Defence Editor - British News

June 14, 2002

Britain's spy chiefs warned the Prime Minister less than two months before September 11 that Usama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida group was in "the final stages" of preparing a terrorist attack in the West, it was disclosed yesterday. The heads of MI6, MI5 and GCHQ, the signals eavesdropping center, suggested that while the most likely targets were American or Israeli, there could be British casualties. Their warning was included in a report sent to Tony Blair and other senior Cabinet Ministers on July 16. But the agency chiefs admitted the "timings, targets and methods of attack" were not known. The disclosure was made yesterday in the annual report of the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, which questioned the intelligence chiefs after the attacks. The July 16 warning to ministers was included in the weekly précis of intelligence assessments made by the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), on which the heads of the intelligence agencies sit. The JIC prediction of an al-Qa'ida attack was based on intelligence gleaned not just from MI6 and GCHQ but also from U.S. agencies, including the CIA and the NSA, which has staff working jointly with GCHQ. The CIA sometimes has a representative on the JIC.

The contents of the July 16 warning would have been passed to the Americans, Whitehall sources confirmed. The news is consistent with what is now known about warnings given by American agencies before September 11. President Bush was given a CIA briefing on August 6 about a possible terrorist hijacking but the final pieces in the intelligence jigsaw "when, where and how" were missing. Subsequently it has emerged that an FBI agent's warning of

Arab suspects taking flying lessons was ignored. The Intelligence and Security Committee, headed by Ann Taylor, the former Leader of the Commons, said that the JIC assessment was “not a stark warning of immediate danger to the UK.” However, the July 2001 JIC assessment, warning that “organized attacks were in their final stages of preparation,” predicted that “UK interests were at risk, including from collateral damage in attacks on US targets.”

Seventy-eight Britons died in the attack on the World Trade Centre. Yesterday Richard Perle, the former U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary, said in London that Britain was exposed to terrorist attack “more than anywhere else other than the U.S. Britain is a very open place with a large population from which terrorists can be recruited. In examining Britain’s preparedness for an al-Qa’ida attack last year, the committee report said “the shortage of specific intelligence and Usama bin Laden’s record could have warned all concerned that more urgent action was needed to counter this threat.” The eight MPs and one peer said it was a “matter of conjecture” whether this would have forestalled bin Laden’s actions. But they noted that all three agencies had suffered cutbacks in funds and staffing in the 1990s and had been “operating under financial pressures prior to the September 11 attacks.” Mrs Taylor said that there had been “intelligence gaps,” and one problem was that the agencies had not envisaged the scale of the September 11 attack. The committee report concluded: “With hindsight, the scale of the threat and the vulnerability of Western states to terrorists with this degree of sophistication and a total disregard for their own lives was not understood.”

The committee, which oversees the work of MI6, MI5 and GCHQ and always takes evidence in private, said: “The questions are whether the threat posed by UBL (Usama bin Laden) was understood and whether it was effectively brought to ministers’ attention.” Before September 11 the security and intelligence services had “identified the pressing need” to gather intelligence about bin Laden and al-Qa’ida “a notably hard target” to penetrate and had informed ministers “that action was in hand.” The report, the first parliamentary assessment of intelligence leads before September 11, said: “The agencies have told us they had no intelligence forewarning them specifically about the September 11 attacks on the U.S.” Sir Stephen Lander, Director-General of MI5, had told the committee seven weeks after the attacks that a subsequent re-examination of material did not find any that, with the wisdom of hindsight, could have given warning of the attacks. John Scarlett, who took over as chairman of the JIC a few days before the attacks in America, told the committee, according to the report, that there was “an acute awareness in the period before September 11” that bin Laden and his associates “represented a very serious threat” and that there was “planning activity.”

BBC

11 July, 2002

U.S. embassy in al-Qa’ida visa probe U.S. authorities are investigating a suspected visa scam which may have allowed 71 people - including some with links to the 11 September attackers that the U.S. blames on the al-Qa’ida network - to have entered America illegally. At least

one former employee of the U.S. embassy in Qatar has been questioned about alleged bribery, reports say. The FBI has detained 31 people suspected of entering the U.S. with visas illegally obtained at the embassy, U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Reeker said. He said that investigators were still looking for 29 more people who had received suspect visas. Six others are believed to have left the U.S. and five others believed to have entered the U.S. illegally are spouses or children of a visa holder, Mr Reeker said. Other officials, quoted by the AFP news agency, said that the investigation dubbed "Operation Eagle Strike" had identified 39 Jordanians, 28 Pakistanis, three Bangladeshis and one Syrian who had received visas from the embassy in Doha between July 2000 and May 2001. The officials said those who had been detained since 24 June were 25 Jordanians, five Pakistanis and one Syrian.

Three are believed to have links with the 19 hijackers who took part in the 11 September attacks, the officials said. The three include Ramsi Al-Shannaq, a Jordanian who has admitted being a room-mate of two of the hijackers. He was arrested in Baltimore on 24 June and charged with illegally obtaining a US visa. At a court hearing in Baltimore on Wednesday, Assistant U.S. Attorney Harvey Eisenberg said that Al-Shannaq, 27, had been denied visas four times before paying \$13,000 for an illegal one. Mr Eisenberg said Al-Shannaq was part of a bribery ring that involved pay-offs of more than \$13,000 per person.

However, Magistrate Susan Gauvey ordered that Al-Shannaq be released on conditional bail, saying that there was no evidence he had anything to do with the 11 September attacks. Her ruling was upheld on appeal. A U.S. official told AFP that the purpose of Operation Eagle Strike was to determine how the visas had been obtained and if terrorists had used them to plot attacks against the United States. Another unnamed U.S. official told the Associated Press: "We don't know exactly how it was accomplished. There are a lot of safeguards and checks. But we don't have our facts. It is still under investigation."

MIAMI HERALD

U.S. ignored terror signals, inquiry says

Thursday, September 19, 2002

Frank Davies

WASHINGTON - U.S. officials consistently underestimated credible warnings about al-Qa'ida terrorist threats on U.S. soil; some involving aircraft and plots against the World Trade Center and Washington as early as 1998, a congressional inquiry into the Sept. 11 attacks revealed Wednesday. "Even those of us who couldn't seem to utter the words 'intelligence failure' are now convinced of it," Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., and the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said during the first day of public hearings. "A number of these threat warnings were eerily close to what actually happened," said Sen. Bob Graham, D-Fla., the co-chairman of the hearings. "How is it, that so many blocks of information were never analyzed collectively? If a single set of eyes could have seen the emerging plot, leading to more questions, with some good fortune we could have been able to take down this plot before it was implemented," Graham said.

REUTERS

U.S. Spy Agencies Had 30 Pre-9/11 'Chatter' Messages

Tabassum Zakaria

September 9, 2002

WASHINGTON - Before Sept. 11, U.S. agencies collected about 30 communications from suspected al-Qa'ida operatives or other militants referring to an imminent event, but many were false alarms, a U.S. intelligence official said on Monday. "You can't dismiss any of them, but it doesn't tell you tomorrow is the day," the official told Reuters on condition of anonymity. Messages from members of Usama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida network included the phrases "Tomorrow is zero hour" and "The match begins tomorrow," which government sources have said were picked up on Sept. 10 by National Security Agency eavesdropping on global communications. Those two messages were not translated from Arabic until Sept. 12. Critics have called them examples of missed clues. The United States has blamed al-Qa'ida for the Sept. 11 attacks that killed about 3,000 people. Intelligence officials say many such communications; called 'chatter,' end up being just a show of bravado or morale boosting. Without a specific location and time for a planned attack it was difficult to assess the threat, they say. More recently, U.S. intelligence agencies have picked up a handful of al-Qa'ida communications making vague threats related to the Sept. 11 anniversary, but without any specific details. "You should not put a chatter meter on it," a U.S. official said. "Just because you hear a lot doesn't mean it's going to happen. Just because you hear a little doesn't mean it's not."

THE NEW YORK TIMES

3 October 2001

In 1994, two jetliners were hijacked by people who wanted to crash them into buildings, one of them by an Islamic militant group. And the 2000 edition of the FAA's annual report on Criminal Acts Against Aviation, published this year, [2001] said that although Usama bin Laden 'is not known to have attacked civil aviation, he has both the motivation and the wherewithal to do so,' adding, 'Bin Laden's anti-Western and anti-American attitudes make him and his followers a significant threat to civil aviation, particularly to U.S. civil aviation.'

WASHINGTON POST

NSA Intercepts On Eve of 9/11 Sent a Warning-Messages Translated After Attacks

Walter Pincus & Dana Priest

Staff Writers

Thursday, June 20, 2002

The National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted two messages on the eve of the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon warning that something was going to happen the next day, but the messages were not translated until Sept. 12, senior U.S. intelligence officials said yesterday. The Arabic-language messages said, "The match is about to begin" and "Tomorrow is zero hour." They were discussed Tuesday before the House-

Senate intelligence committee during closed-door questioning of Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, director of the NSA, the agency responsible for intercepting and analysing electronic messages.

Intelligence officials said the two messages, even if translated on Sept. 10, would not have provided enough information to prevent the attacks. But their disclosure put the NSA in the spotlight for the first time since reports of intelligence failures began to emerge this spring and seemed likely to sharpen the focus of the congressional investigation, which has been dominated by concerns about the performance of the FBI and the CIA, on problems at the nation's premier eavesdropping agency. U.S. intelligence sources said NSA analysts are not certain who was speaking on the Sept. 10 intercepts. They came from sources (a location or phone number) that were of high-enough priority to translate them within two days but were not put in the top priority category, which included communications from Usama bin Laden or his senior al-Qa'ida assistants. "There had been a lot of chatter up there indicating something was up," a senior administration official said. "But it does not say where, what and how reliable." The official said the messages appear dramatic in hindsight but added: "If you had it on September 10th, what does it tell you that is actionable?" The NSA declined to comment on the intercepts. "I have no information to provide," NSA spokeswoman Judy Emmel said.

The NSA, based at Fort Meade, is one of the government's most secretive intelligence agencies. It intercepts more than 2 million electronic communications an hour: Telephone conversations, e-mails, internet traffic, from satellites and listening posts around the world. Although the NSA consumes an estimated \$6 billion of the \$30 billion the government budgets for intelligence each year, and spends most of it on high-tech interception equipment, the agency does not have adequate means to filter out the millions of bits of irrelevant information it scoops up each day. Intelligence budgets are classified. Without such filters, human translators must sort through mountains of data, and only a fraction of the foreign-language material is translated promptly. Much is never analyzed. Analysts said the fate of the Sept. 10 intercepts points to a broader aspect of the effort to improve intelligence gathering: Technology vs. humans. More than the CIA, the NSA has been criticized for failing to put sufficient emphasis on employing enough skilled translators and analysts to decipher what it collects. Many observers of the intelligence system credit Hayden, who was appointed director of the agency in March 1999, with recognizing the problem and trying to fix it.

Over the past several years, the House and Senate intelligence panels have criticized the NSA's failure to modernize its operations as communications technologies have become more sophisticated. Computers that over the past decade were used to scan messages for certain key words have proved much less effective as targets have changed from official Russian military and intelligence transmissions to those of individual terrorists and terrorist groups around the world. Congress has added money to the NSA budget in recent years, and Hayden has assembled a major renovation plan for the agency, but Congress has questioned whether it is satisfactory.

DAILY NEWS

Feds say Mid-Easterners knew of the coming danger

Greg B. Smith Staff Writer

Federal investigators have received evidence that some Middle Easterners in the New York area were warned ahead of time to stay out of lower Manhattan the morning of Sept. 11, the *Daily News* has learned. The FBI was able to confirm several such warnings occurred but has been unable to discover the source of the warnings. Agents with the FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force have interviewed school officials in Jersey City and Brooklyn and questioned members of a Bronx mosque about the warnings, sources told *The News*. James Margolin, a spokesman for the FBI's New York office, confirmed that agents were looking into several reports of warnings that preceded the attack against the World Trade Centre. "Among the e-mails and tips we received are a number of reports of people overhearing people boasting about or warning about coming attacks," he said. He declined to discuss specifics and would not say whether any of the 600-plus people detained in the terror probe were questioned about pre-attack warnings.

LONDON TIMES

Rushdie's air ban

James Doran

September 27, 2001

The author Salman Rushdie believes that U.S. authorities knew of an imminent terrorist strike when they banned him from taking internal flights in Canada and the U.S. only a week before the attacks. On September 3, 2001, the FAA made an emergency ruling to prevent Rushdie from flying unless airlines complied with strict and costly security measures. Rushdie told *The Times* that the airlines would not upgrade their security. The FAA told the author's publisher that U.S. intelligence had given warning of "something out there" but failed to give any further details. The FAA confirmed that it stepped up security measures concerning Rushdie, but refused to give a reason.

WASHINGTON TIMES

Soldiers say U.S. let Taliban General go

Rowan Scarborough

*December 18, 2002*⁵

U.S. troops say that the military mistakenly released one of the most-wanted Taliban leaders in Afghanistan in the summer [2002] based on faulty intelligence. U.S. Special Forces soldiers said that in late July, [2002] a Green Beret A-Team, backed by about 20 local Afghan fighters, apprehended Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani as he left his compound at daybreak in a town west of Kandahar. Soldiers identified him as Osmani, handcuffed him and brought him by truck to Kandahar. Osmani, among the top six most-wanted Taliban, was flown to a detention

⁵ [<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20021218-35993132.htm>]

center at Bagram air base, north of Kabul, for interrogation, the Special Forces soldiers said. He was one of the Taliban's top Generals, leading thousands of troops as coalition forces ousted the hard-line regime. But, according to these soldiers (Task Force 180 the overall command in Afghanistan) released Osmani a few weeks later.

U.S. government spokesmen expressed skepticism about the soldiers' account in written responses to *The Washington Times*. The *Times* sources maintain their account is accurate. Two Army soldiers and a senior administration official said in interviews that a U.S. intelligence report placed Osmani in another location after his apprehension. This led to his release. Rather than return to his village, Osmani quickly fled to Pakistan, where he remains today, military officials said.

A spokesman for U.S. Central Command, which runs operations in Afghanistan, declined to comment on questions submitted by *The Times*. Col. Roger King, chief spokesman for Task Force 180 in Bagram, said, "We don't discuss specifics of persons captured, neither names nor nationalities. I will tell you that Osmani is one of those we seek." Col. King quoted Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill, the task force commander, as saying, "If we had captured Osmani we would still have him." Asked if a detainee by the name of Akhter Osmani had been listed at the detention center in the summer, Col. King referred to Gen. McNeill's statement.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates the distribution of information to commanders, said in a statement, "DIA has no knowledge that Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani was ever in U.S. custody in Afghanistan. Given Osmani's high profile and our interest in detaining him, misidentification by experienced personnel is unlikely." The soldiers and the administration official, however, are convinced that the United States had Osmani, then mistakenly let him go. They asked not to be identified for fear of reprisal from superiors. Osmani is one of a handful of top former Taliban leaders trying to organize a guerrilla force of fellow militants to disrupt the U.S. backed government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. The list of the six most-wanted Taliban also includes former group supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar; Mullah Omar's top aide, Tayeb Agha; and top military commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani. Mullah Omar is believed to be in hiding in his native Uruzgan Province, an area riddled with drug traffickers and Taliban supporters north of Kandahar.

Helmand Province, famous for its poppy crop, also was a haven for Taliban fighters in the summer, when informants told Special Forces soldiers that Osmani had returned to his home in the province. The former general was living in a compound in the village of Sangin, west of Kandahar, under the protection of Helmand power brokers, the Afghan informants said. "Right after the sweep through the country in the early spring, they ran," said one soldier. "But after time when it became obvious we were not actively looking for these people, they returned home or back to the areas they lived in." A Special Forces team traveled by night, via trucks, to the town. They kept the house under surveillance until the man believed to be Osmani emerged to walk to the local mosque. The man carried some type of old Taliban identification card that contained his picture and the name Osmani, and the name of Osmani's father. He also had burn scars on his chest that matched intelligence data, the

soldiers said. His Afghan companion was searched. Large amounts of cash in Pakistan's currency were found in secret, sewed compartments. The man identified as Osmani refused to give his name, saying only in his native Pashtun, "Praise is God." "He was on our list of Taliban to kill, capture or disrupt, the HVT [high value target] list," said one soldier. "He was in Osmani's house. His ID said he was Osmani." The one discrepancy was that he appeared too young. Intelligence reports put Osmani at about age 40. This man was in his early 30s. Still, soldiers said they believed the intelligence in Afghanistan was sometimes shaky, and that the estimated age could be incorrect. They took the man into custody. "When I heard that the scar was consistent, I think they had all the reason on earth to err on the side of caution," said one Special Forces soldier. "Let's say it was his kid brother, you don't release a guy like that, either." Soldiers handcuffed the man, loaded him on the back of a truck and drove back to base camp in Kandahar. Osmani stayed there for a few days before he was flown to Bagram.

"All our Afghan fighters kept their faces covered when they were around him," said a soldier. A few weeks later, Osmani was back on a flight, this time to freedom in Kandahar. Afghan sources later told soldiers that he had fled to Pakistan. "When they let him go, this guy ran like a mad man for Pakistan. He hit the ground and was gone," said the soldier. "Then I heard, everybody was like 'whoops.' Maybe we should have kept our hand on him." Some Special Forces soldiers have expressed frustration with Task Force 180 for turning down their written concept of operations, or conops, to attack suspected Taliban. The soldiers said in interviews that they gained information on several occasions last summer on the whereabouts of Mullah Omar. But, they said, commanders turned down the missions, citing extreme risk.

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ⁶

Closing this section, on page 18 of the NSA manual to its employees, it states that "the extraordinary sensitivity of the NSA mission requires the prompt reporting of any known, suspected, or possible unauthorized disclosure of classified information, or the discovery that classified information may be lost, or is not being afforded proper protection. Any information coming to your attention concerning the loss or unauthorized disclosure of classified information should be reported immediately to your supervisor, your Staff Security Officer, or the Security Operations Center (SOC)."

That the NSA was a tenant in the WTC7 on floors 9 and 10 (85343 sq.ft.) there would have been a loss of material when that building was demolished. There was no report of their loss to any news media.

⁶ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

BIN LADEN Usama
A-268/5-1998



PRESENT FAMILY NAME: BIN LADEN

FORENAME: Usama

SEX: M

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1957 - Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

(FATHER'S FORENAMES: Abdulrahman 'Awadh

IDENTITY CONFIRMED - NATIONALITY: SAUDI ARABIAN (CONFIRMED)

LANGUAGE SPOKEN: Arabic.

ACCOMPLICES:

AL-'ALWAN Faraj Mikha'il Abdul-Fadeel Jibril, born in 1969, subject of red notice File No. 1998/20220, Control No. A-270/5-1998;

AL-WARFALI Faez Abu Zeid Muftah, born in 1968, subject of red notice File No. 1998/20223, Control No. A-271/5-1998;

AL-CHALABI Faraj, born in 1966, subject of red notice File No. 1998/20230, Control No. A-269/5-1998.

SUMMARY OF FACTS OF THE CASE: LIBYA: On 10th March 1994, BIN LADEN, AL-CHALABI, AL-'ALWAN and AL-WARFALI killed two German nationals near Surt.

REASON FOR NOTICE: Wanted on arrest warrant No. 1.27.288/1998, issued on 16th March 1998 by the judicial authorities in Tripoli, Libya, for murder and illegal possession of firearms.

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If found in a country from which extradition will be requested, please detain; if found elsewhere, please keep a watch on his movements and activities. In either case, immediately inform INTERPOL TRIPOLI (Reference 6.27.8497.352 of 15th April 1998) and the ICPO-Interpol General Secretariat.

File No. 1998/20232

Refer to FBI

Control No. A-268/5-1998

19

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II Middles

The CIA has always had a Special Activities Division (SAD), which secretly carries out special operation missions. However, since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has relied much more on Special Activities Division/Special Operations Group (SAD/SOG) because fighting terrorists does not usually involve fighting other armies. Rather, it involves secretly moving in and out of countries like Pakistan, Iran and Somalia where the American military is not legally allowed to operate. If there are missions in these countries that are denied to U.S. military special operations forces, SAD/SOG units are the primary national special missions units to execute those operations.⁷

The screenshot shows the TIME.com website interface. At the top is a navigation bar with links for HOME, U.S., POLITICS, WORLD, BUSINESS, MONEY, TECH, HEALTH, SCIENCE, ARTS, TRAVEL, PHOTOS, VIDEO, SPECIALS, MAGAZINE, and NEWSFEED. Below this is a search bar and a subscription link. The main headline is "The CIA's Secret Army: The CIA's Secret Army" by Douglas Waller, dated Monday, Feb. 03, 2009. The article text begins with "The U.S. is not yet at war with Saddam Hussein. Not officially. But quietly, over the past few months, some of its savviest warriors have sneaked into his country. They have been secretly prowling the Kurdish-controlled enclave in northern Iraq, trying to organize a guerrilla force that could guide American soldiers invading from the north, hunting for targets that U.S. warplanes might bomb, setting up networks to hide U.S. pilots who might be shot down and mapping out escape routes to get them out. And they are doing the same in southern Iraq with dissident Shi'ites." The article continues with a paragraph about the CIA's operations and a quote from a U.S. intelligence official. To the left of the article are sponsored links for the Official Barack Obama Website and 10 Best Credit Cards. To the right is a "Most Popular" section with a list of 10 articles, including "Bagels: An American Tragedy" and "Game, Sex and Match: The Perils of Female Sports Advertising". At the bottom right is a "Recommendations" section with links to various articles.

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The CIA's Secret Army: The CIA's Secret Army

By DOUGLAS WALLER/WASHINGTON Monday, Feb. 03, 2009

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Pack Your (Book) Bag

Glenn Beck Bids Farewell: His Top 10 Fox News Moments

The U.S. is not yet at war with Saddam Hussein. Not officially. But quietly, over the past few months, some of its savviest warriors have sneaked into his country. They have been secretly prowling the Kurdish-controlled enclave in northern Iraq, trying to organize a guerrilla force that could guide American soldiers invading from the north, hunting for targets that U.S. warplanes might bomb, setting up networks to hide U.S. pilots who might be shot down and mapping out escape routes to get them out. And they are doing the same in southern Iraq with dissident Shi'ites.

But the biggest surprise of all is that they are not even soldiers; they are spies, part of the CIA's rough and ready, supersecret Special Operations Group (SOG). Until fairly recently, the CIA, in an effort to clean up a reputation sullied by botched overseas coups and imperial assassination attempts, had shied away from getting its hands dirty. Until about five years ago, it focused instead on gathering intelligence that could be used by other parts of the government. Before that, traditional CIA officers, often working under cover as U.S. diplomats, got most of their secrets from the embassy cocktail circuit or by bribing foreign officials. Most did not even have weapons training, and they looked down on the few SOG commandos who remained out in the field as knuckle draggers, relics of a bygone era. Now the knuckle draggers are not just back; they are the new hard edge of the CIA, at the forefront of the war on terrorism. And, says a U.S. intelligence official, "they know which end the bullet comes out of."

It was George Tenet who began rebuilding the SOG five years ago when he took charge of the CIA, but the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, accelerated his efforts.

Confronted with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, an enemy that has no army, no fixed assets and no clearly defined territory, the Bush Administration needed an unconventional military force. It wanted combatants who could match al-Qaeda for wiliness,

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⁷ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. (2004)

Top 10
Expendable
Girlfriends
and the Men
Who Loved
Them
(Briefly)

adaptability and, up to a point, ruthlessness. It wanted its own army of James Bonds. So in the past year, hundreds of millions of additional dollars have been pumped into the CIA budget by President George W. Bush, a man who may be predisposed to believe strongly in an agency his father once headed. He has ordered SOG operatives to join forces with foreign intelligence services. He has even authorized the CIA to kidnap terrorists in order to break their cells or kill them.

All of which could make for a more agile, effective intelligence agency. Or it could also mean a CIA that once again steps beyond the realm of collecting secrets to intervening forcibly in the affairs of foreign states. In that area, the agency's history has often been one of blunders and worse, from Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s through the Bay of Pigs fiasco under John F. Kennedy to the Nicaraguan war that led to the Iran-contra debacle in the '80s. Some longtime intelligence watchers are wondering whether a reinvigorated paramilitary wing of the CIA could be a mixed blessing for America once again. And the military itself is not too pleased. It believes its special-ops forces are perfectly equipped to handle these jobs. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has reacted in part by planning his own secret unit, which would function much like the SOG but would answer to him rather than Tenet.

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Though tiny by Pentagon standards, the Special Operations Group has swelled to several hundred officers. They are planted in Pakistan, Central Asia, North Africa and East Asia. "These are people who are operating every day around the world," Jim Pavitt, the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations told *TIME*. "I can insert a team anywhere quickly and clandestinely." The future may bring even more ambitious missions.

In May 2002, ex-President Bush signed a top-secret directive authorizing pre-emptive strikes by the Pentagon and the CIA against nations that are close to acquiring nuclear weapons. Administration sources tell *TIME* that the Department of Energy's nuclear-weapons experts are training SOG operatives on ways to attack enemy nuclear facilities. In the crisis with North Korea, Washington so far is committed to diplomacy as a means of pressuring Pyongyang to give up its atomic-arms program, but it might well be a Special Operations Group team that gets called to action.

The over the wisdom of expanding CIA powers in this way has been confined mostly to a small group of professionals, escaping the public's notice. That's largely because the evolution of the CIA's mission has proceeded so quietly. Americans did get a glimpse into the world of the CIA paramilitary when Johnny (Mike) Spann, 32-years-old was killed in Afghanistan in November 2001 after being overpowered by Taliban prisoners he had been interrogating;

⁸ [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml]

uncharacteristically, the CIA confirmed that Spann was one of its own, a member of the SOG. Another peek into the shadows came when it was revealed that the explosion that had carbonized a carful of alleged al-Qa'ida operatives in Yemen was caused by a Hellfire missile let loose by a CIA Predator drone.

The outlines of this new mission are not new, but *TIME* uncovered enough fresh details to construct the fullest picture yet of the CIA's secret army. It spoke to past and current intelligence officials, including an active member of the SOG, as well as to detractors within the Pentagon.

Who joins up? CIA recruiters regularly prowl clubs like those at Fort Bragg, N.C. where the Army's Special Operations Command has its headquarters, looking for Green Berets interested in even more unconventional work and higher pay (a starting SOG officer can earn more than \$50,000 a year; a sergeant in the Green Berets begins at about \$41,000). Special-forces soldiers, Navy seals and Air Force commandos are routinely dispatched to the agency on a temporary basis to provide special military skills that the CIA needs for specific missions. If a soldier is assigned highly clandestine work, his records are changed to make it appear as if he resigned from the military or was given civilian status; the process is called "sheep dipping" after the practice of bathing sheep before they are sheared.

Military commandos who join the CIA full time are sent to the "farm," the agency's Camp Peary training center, located on 9,000 heavily wooded acres surrounded by a barbed-wire-topped fence near Williamsburg, Virginia. There the soldiers go through the yearlong course that all new CIA case officers must take to learn such skills of the trade as infiltrating hostile countries, communicating in codes, retrieving messages from dead drops and recruiting foreign agents to spy for the United States. The CIA wants its paramilitary officers to be able to steal secrets as well as blow up bridges. At Camp Peary, new SOG recruits also hone their paramilitary skills, like sharpshooting with various kinds of weapons, setting up landing zones in remote areas for agency aircraft and attacking enemy sites with a small force. Some are sent to Delta Force's secret compound at Fort Bragg to learn highly specialized counterterrorism techniques, such as how to rescue a fellow agent held hostage.

The SOG traces its roots to the days of William (Wild Bill) Donovan, the General in charge of espionage and clandestine operations during World War II, whose Office of Strategic Services sent paramilitary commandos behind enemy lines. The CIA, since its founding after the war, has always had a paramilitary unit, which has carried various names. At the height of the cold war, the agency had hundreds of paramilitary operatives fomenting coups around the world. It was involved in assassination plots against the leaders of Congo, Cuba and Iraq and was linked by a 1976 Senate inquiry to ousters that resulted in the deaths of the leaders of the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and Chile. When Ronald Reagan wanted to roll back communism in the 1980s, the agency organized paramilitary operations in Central America. These adventures had checkered results. The governments that the CIA destabilized in Iran, Guatemala and Chile were replaced by repressive regimes that ended up doing more damage in the long run to U.S. foreign policy. By 1990 the SOG had practically been disbanded, the

victim of domestic and international outrage over the agency's lethal meddling in other countries. Congressional and CIA budget cutters slashed money for the clandestine force, believing that billion-dollar spy satellites collected intelligence more efficiently and without embarrassing America. The pendulum soon began to swing back however, as intelligence officials realized that technology has its limitations. Satellites, for instance, can't see inside buildings, at least not yet; phone taps can't capture an enemy's every move. When Tenet was installed as CIA Director in 1997, he began fielding more human spies and rebuilding the SOG. Under such knowledge, that Tenet had been rebuilding SOG since 1997, it is not hard to visualize why he had been accused of forgery by Ron Suskind, in his novel, entitled: *The Way of the World*, published in 2008 and covered by the *Los Angeles Times* below.

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Did White House fake link between Saddam and Al Qaeda?

10:44 AM PT, **Aug 5 2008**



First, former CIA Director George Tenet told the president it was a "slam dunk" that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Then came efforts by the Bush White House to discredit critics, like ambassador Joe Wilson, who questioned the wisdom of going to war in Iraq.

Now comes a new book by author Ron Suskind claiming that the White House ordered the CIA to forge and backdate a handwritten letter from the head of Iraqi intelligence to Saddam Hussein to link the Iraq regime to Al Qaeda. The White House calls the assertion nonsense.

In "The Way of the World," to be published today, Suskind writes:

The White House had concocted a fake letter from Habbush to Saddam, backdated to July 1, 2001. It said that 9/11 ringleader Mohammad Atta had actually trained for his mission in Iraq — thus showing, finally, that there was an operational link between Saddam and al Qaeda, something the vice president's office had been pressing CIA to prove since 9/11 as a justification to invade Iraq. There is no link.

Suskind says the order to forge such a letter was written on "creamy White House stationery" but gives no details about how it was created or how it was delivered to Iraq.

The White House dismissed the accusation as so much sensationalism from a sensationalizing journalist. According to a story about the forgery in Politico, spokesman Tony Fratto said, "The allegation that the White House directed anyone to forge a document from Habbush to Saddam is just absurd."

Tenet weighed in to defend the administration, issuing a statement saying:

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There was no such order from the White House to me nor, to the best of my knowledge, was anyone from CIA ever involved in any such effort.

Asked about Tenet's response to claims of a [forgery](#) on the "Today Show" this morning, Suskind dismissed it as "part of George's memory issue."

Suskind was last in the news for co-authoring former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill's kiss-and-tell memoir, "The Price of Loyalty." He is not viewed as a friend of the Bush White House. As Fratto said:

Ron Suskind makes a living from gutter journalism. He is about selling books and making wild allegations that no one can verify, including the numerous bipartisan commissions that have reported on prewar intelligence.

On the same day Suskind's book was published, a conservative national defense analyst issued a report saying that there were WMD and that the president kept quiet about a discovery that could have blown his critics out of the water to keep terrorists in the dark.

Retired Maj. Gen. Jerry Curry, who ran for the Republican nomination for president this year, reported in a [national security](#) blog item that U.S. operatives secretly transported Iraqi uranium to Canada for examination during a two-week airlift from Baghdad that featured a ship voyage crossing two oceans. He said of Bush:

He made a very brave stand, a resolute stand ... in which he decided that he wasn't going to blab everything to the press.... And in the meantime while he kept it quiet, he was buying time from the terrorists to get all that stuff out of the country. So that's what was done -- he just very quietly kept his mouth shut.

The press beat him to death for the last several years, and now it turns out that, yes, there were weapons of mass destruction.

-- Johanna Neuman

Photo: President Bush at a 2003 briefing with, from left, Vice President Dick Cheney, CIA Director George Tenet and Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. Credit: Eric Draper / White House

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The article in *TIME* also tells us how it was when the Bush Administration was on the throne: "Rumsfeld, nevertheless, is intent on building his own covert force. He recently ordered the Special Operations Command to draw up secret plans to launch attacks against al-Qa'ida around the world, and he intends to put an extra \$1 billion in its budget next year for the job. Elsewhere in the defense department, small, clandestine units, coordinating little with the CIA, are busy organizing their own future battles. Several hundred Army agents, with what was originally known as the Intelligence Support Activity, train to infiltrate foreign countries to scout targets. With headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, the unit is so secretive it changes its cover name every six months. Delta Force has a platoon of about 100 intelligence operatives trained to sneak into a foreign country and radio back last-minute intelligence before the force's commandos swoop in for an attack. ¹⁰ The CIA isn't amused.

"Don't replicate what you don't need to replicate," argues a senior U.S. Intelligence officer. So who referees this dispute? In addition to running the CIA, Tenet, as Director of Central Intelligence, is supposed to oversee all intelligence programs in the U.S. government. But the Pentagon, which controls more than 80% of the estimated \$35 billion intelligence budget,

⁹ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

¹⁰ *TIME* Magazine.

doesn't want him meddling in its spying. Ultimately, the man who chooses between them is the President. Both Tenet and Rumsfeld report directly to him. "And thus far, Bush has been eager to give Tenet leeway to build up his commando force. With a major conflict looming in Iraq, units from all branches of the military are mobilizing to get a piece of the action. The CIA, at least, will have its own."

It is probably a few who know that George H. Walker Bush was the only ex-President of the United States who still received every morning CIA reports. This was an honour or privilege since Bush Sr., was a CIA Intelligence Officer during the days of Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, Texas, as the following declassified document shows, dated November 29, 1963.

1 - Rosen
1 - Liaison
1 - Nasca

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FBI

Date: November 29, 1963

To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
NOVEMBER 22, 1963

Our Miami, Florida, Office on November 23, 1963, advised that the Office of Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in Miami advised that the Department of State feels some misguided anti-Castro group might capitalize on the present situation and undertake an unauthorized raid against Cuba, believing that the assassination of President John F. Kennedy might herald a change in U. S. policy, which is not true.

Our sources and informants familiar with Cuban matters in the Miami area advise that the general feeling in the anti-Castro Cuban community is one of stunned disbelief and, even among those who did not entirely agree with the President's policy concerning Cuba, the feeling is that the President's death represents a great loss not only to the U. S. but to all of Latin America. These sources know of no plans for unauthorized action against Cuba.

An informant who has furnished reliable information in the past and who is close to a small pro-Castro group in Miami has advised that these individuals are afraid that the assassination of the President may result in strong repressive measures being taken against them and, although pro-Castro in their feelings, regret the assassination.

The substance of the foregoing information was orally furnished to Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency and Captain William Lockwood of the Defense Intelligence Agency on November 23, 1963, by Mr. W. T. Forsyth of this Bureau.

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

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TELETYPE UNIT

Such honours given to Bush Sr., are not given lightly; neither was the privilege to have his name commemorate the current CIA building. It would not be an understatement to say, that the prevailing power of George H. Walker Bush, is possibly the uniqueness in American espionage.



George Bush Center for Intelligence - CIA Headquarters was renamed for President George Herbert Walker Bush April 26, 1999.¹¹

Apart from the Special Activities Division and the Special Operations Group previously mentioned, there is the Special Operations Forces (SOF). In their report, entitled: “U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress,”¹² written by Andrew Feickert (Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division), updated September 28, 2004, it states:

“There are small, elite military units with special training and equipment that can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy, specialized training. U.S. SOF units total roughly 34,000 active and about 15,000 reserve personnel in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, or about 2% of all U.S. active and reserve forces. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) oversees the training, doctrine, and equipping of all U.S. SOF units.”

Psychological oppressive techniques are not new; they go back into the dark ages of history, to Queen Elizabeth II who used them against her enemies. One such enemy was the Catholic Queen Mary of Scotland. During one of Elizabeth’s Privy Council gatherings, her consultants noted how the Catholic Queen of Scots was gaining support in Protestant Scotland by achieving favours from one of the most rich and powerful Catholic families. Elizabeth ordered the destruction of this family. Her counselors argued the family was too strong. “Then have Mary Queen of Scots herself, destroy them.” Elizabeth declared. “Give Mary Queen of Scots no choice but to destroy her strongest allies. The strong must show they are strong. That is their weakness.”

¹¹ [<https://www.cia.gov/flash-movie-text.html>]

¹² Order code RS21048.

Further on in the Special Operations Forces manual, note should be made on the power given to this elite group: “In January 2003, DoD [Department of Defense] gave USSOCOM greater responsibility for planning and directing worldwide counterterrorism operations. Instead of being primarily a supporting command that provides forces to other regional U.S. combatant commanders, USSOCOM will more often be a supported command capable of planning and conducting operations in its own right. To facilitate this new authority, USSOCOM reportedly reorganized its headquarters to better conduct collaborative planning with DoD, the Intelligence Community, and various government agencies.”

Which “various government agencies” is unknown; however, in the above paragraph, they explicitly say that prior 2003 they had responsibility “for planning and directing worldwide counterterrorism operations;” it was only after 2003 that the Department of Defense gave them “greater responsibility for planning and directing worldwide counterterrorism operations.” They must have grown into giants by now. But it was these elite forces that trampled over hills and mountains, invading caves and huts, to seek out Usama bin Laden in 2001. And it was these forces that took him down, covertly, which was noticed by a few who were paying attention. ¹³

¹³ More on this subject can be found here: [<http://www.scribd.com/doc/65125486/Peddling-Power-1-Flight-AA11>]

III

Endings

On September 11, 2010, just nine years after 9/11, the FBI releases a declassified document from 1952, which reports an atomic bomb was suspected to be in storage in an unknown consulate within New York City. Among the consulates investigated, was the Hungarian during the period June - November, 1951. See below.

Other areas investigated were the United Nations (680 Park Avenue); Amtorg Trading Corporation (49 West 37th Street); Soviet News Agency, Tass (90 Rockefeller Plaza); Polish consulate (151 East 67th Street); and, the Czechoslovakian United Nations Delegation (6th East 67th Street).

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1-human)
DATE 11-09-2010

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SECURITY INFORMATION ~~SECRET~~

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **NEW YORK** ND

REPORT MADE AT NEW YORK	DATE WHEN MADE 10/14/52	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 7/25/52	REPORT MADE BY [Redacted]
TITLE ATOMIC BOMB IN UNKNOWN CONSULATE, NEW YORK CITY			CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY-R
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: Confidential Informant T-1 advised that he had no reason to believe that atomic materials had been stored in the Hungarian Consulate at NYC, during the period June - November, 1951 when it was open.			
DETAILS: Confidential Informant T-1, of known reliability, advised that he had no reason to believe that atomic materials might have been stored in the Hungarian Consulate at New York City, during the period when it was open, June - November, 1951.			
APPROVED AND FORWARDED: Leland T. [Signature] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE			
DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES 95-14562-21 RECORDED - 105 EX-60			
COPIES OF THIS REPORT (5) Bureau (105-14562) (Registered Mail) 3 New York [Redacted] b2			

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AGENCY TO WHICH LOANED.

SECURITY INFORMATION ~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNIT

TO : Director, FBI (105-14562)
FROM : SAC, New York [redacted] b2
SUBJECT: ATOMIC BOMB IN UNKNOWN CONSULATE,
NEW YORK CITY
IS - R

DATE: 3/17/52

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Laughlin _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

Rebulet 1/23/52.

Referral/Direct ICE

The following two items are being brought to the attention of the Bureau in that they may have some bearing instant matter:

The 2/11/52 New York "World Telegram and Sun" carried an article captioned "Ace Squads Guard Ports for A-Bomb Smugglers" by the United Press, datelined Washington, 2/11/52. This article related that key personnel of customs searching squads at principal US seaports have been given a special course on atomic weapons by the Atomic Energy Commission at the Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico. The article further stated, among other things, that personnel of the US Customs, particularly the searching personnel, had been alerted for the unauthorized entry of unconventional weapons of war including A-bombs and parts thereof.

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Report
will copy
V-20-52
0-1 N
6-10-52
Report
will copy
7-11-52

The following appeared in the 3/10/52 issue of "Newsweek", under the column known as "The Periscope":

"US atomic scientists have received reports that though the Russians have exploded several A-bombs, none was designed for dropping from a plane. The explosions were from specially rigged towers. The Soviets evidently haven't yet developed a mechanism for dropping the bomb and having it go off at a predetermined height."

In accordance with rebulet, in a reasonable length of time informants and sources of information who may be in a position to furnish information concerning this matter and who have been appropriately alerted will be recontacted.

In the meantime, this case is being maintained in a pending inactive status in the New York Office.

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As seen in the above extract, "US atomic scientists have received reports that though the Russians have exploded several A-bombs, none was designed for dropping from a plane. The explosions were from specially rigged towers."

There have only been two sources that have given different explanations, according to their scientific knowledge and opinion, on how the WTC Towers 1 and 2 exploded, whilst numerous architects and engineers dwell down the path of controlled demolition:

1. Dr Judy Wood and Dr Morgan Reynolds, analyze the explosion of the towers to being created with microwave energy used by the Department of Defense as was also used in Iraq.



President Ronald Reagan

Where do we get 'Star Wars'?

By Sharon Watkins Lang
SMDC/ASTRAT
Historical Office

Almost as soon as President Ronald Reagan introduced his Strategic Defense Initiative, the effort and its associated projects were mocked as nothing more than science fiction — "Star Wars" technology.

Since March 1983, however, the two concepts have been tied together. The current system is even referred to by some writers and critics as the "Son of Star Wars."

The question is where did it begin? The term itself refers to George Lucas' popular 1977 science fiction film. It soon became a part of the vernacular and was used to criticize


various space-based Pentagon projects.

The historians at the Missile Defense Agency, however, trace the link to a March 24, 1983, article from The Washington Post. This article quotes Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), who described the president's proposal as "reckless Star Wars schemes."



Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle
Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS)

- Midcourse interceptor
- On-board multi-band seeker and data processor
- Infrared Focal Plane Array Technology
- Advanced Beryllium optics and tracking algorithms
- Lightweight — 160 kg
- Tests conducted — 3
- Intercepts attempted — 2
- Successful intercepts — 1
- Functional Test Validation for the GBI



Ground Based Radar (GBR)

- Perform surveillance, acquisition, tracking, discrimination, fire control and kill assessment
- Phased array, X-band Radar
- Radiating surface 12 meters in diameter
- Full power acquisition range — 4,000 km or more (prototype reduced range)
- Part of the National Missile Defense System
- Prototype constructed at Kwajalein



Airborne Optical Adjunct/Airborne Surveillance Testbed

- Prototype of the Boeing 767
- Modified cupola — 86 feet long and 10 feet high
- Originally designed for two sensors
- Aircraft-based LWIR technology
- Wide field of view optics
- Focal plane array with 30,000 cryogenically cooled LWIR silicon detector elements
- Three color scanning
- Sensor sensitive enough to detect the heat of a human body at a distance greater than 1,000 miles
- Operate at altitudes in excess of 40,000 feet
- Gathers data in the boost, postboost, midcourse and reentry phases



Ground Based Surveillance
and Tracking System (GSTS)

- Midcourse and Terminal Sensor
- Ground-based missile launched LWIR and visible wave-band sensor
- Lightweight beryllium optics
- Mission — locate, track and discriminate targets from decoys
- Relays data to ground based station to provide weapon tasking and in-flight target support
- Reusable sensor payload
- Provide means to see over-the-horizon

*Fair Use: For more information see footnote. ¹⁴

¹⁴ [<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml>]

2. Dimitri A. Khalezov, a former officer in the Soviet nuclear intelligence who details in an interview on how in his opinion the US Government used three underground thermo-nuclear explosions to demolish three buildings of the World Trade Center in New York during the 9/11 events. In addition, he explains his theory why these buildings were demolished.

FBI statements of what happened on 9/11 contradict the 9/11 Commission Report. The US war against Afghanistan under an official pretext to capture Usama bin Laden in connection with 9/11 contradicts the FBI evidence, as seen earlier on their Most Wanted page, and how they have never charged bin Laden for 9/11. The US war against Iraq contradicts the 9/11 Commission Report, because it does not link Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 perpetration. Nonetheless, the US Government went to war against Iraq to look for weapons of mass destruction, which in 10 years they have never found.

RE-INVESTIGATE 9/11

Edward L. Peck -- Deputy Director of the White House Task Force on Terrorism under President Ronald Reagan; Former Deputy Coordinator, the Secret Intelligence Programs at the State Department; U.S. Ambassador and Head of Mission in Iraq (1977 to 1980); 32 years of service in the Foreign Service, petitioned a request for a new investigation of 9/11.

“We want truthful answers to questions. As responsible Americans, we ask four things: (1) An immediate investigation by the Advocate General in New York, Eliot Spitzer; (2) Surveys immediate congressional hearings; (3) Media attention to scrutinize and investigate the evidence; (4) The creation of a truly independent investigation and based on citizens.”

Paul Craig Roberts -- PhD; Deputy U.S. Treasury Secretary under Ronald Reagan. “Father of Reaganomics.” Former co-editor of The Wall Street Journal; Director of the Institute of Economic Policy and Research Associate at the Independent Institute.

“We know that it is quite impossible for any building, much less building with load-bearing steel squashed at free fall. Therefore, it is an indisputable fact that the official explanation of the collapse of WTC is false. There are many publishers who wait impatiently for the writers who explore the glaring defects of the report of the Sept. 11 commission. It is thought that if this relationship could withstand an analysis would not be a taboo to draw attention to the inadequacy of its explanations.”

Morgan Reynolds Morgan Reynolds -- PhD; Principal Economist Department of Labour under George W. Bush from 2001 to 2002; Former Director of the Criminal Justice Center at the National Center for Policy Analysis; Professor emeritus at Texas A & M University.

“I began to suspect that the 9/11 was an inside job when the Bush-Cheney administration invaded Iraq. We can prove that the government’s version is false. It’s hard to overstate the importance of a scientific debate about the causes of the fall of the twin towers and

Building 7. The work of scientists, engineers and independent researchers from all over the world is to get a proper scientific and engineering analysis of 9/11.”

Catherine Austin Fitts -- Assistant Secretary of Housing under George HW Bush. Former Director of the Wall Street Investment Bank, Dillon, Read & Co.

“The official story could not have happened. It is not possible. It is not practically feasible. The commission was a coat of white.”

Morton Goulder -- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Prevention under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter (1973-77). Founder of Sanders Associates, petitioned a request for a new investigation of 9/11.

Fred Burks -- Former State Department Interpreter for Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the Vice Presidents Dick Cheney and Al Gore, the Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Madeleine Albright; an 18-year career at the State Department.

“How is it possible that our military systems much touted missile detection have not been able to locate the Flight 77 in 42 minutes when it was known that had been lost before it crashed on the heart of the defense system the U.S.?”

General Albert Stubblebine -- U.S. Army (ret.); Commander in Chief of the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) from 1981 to 1984. Also commander of U.S. Army Intelligence Centre. Before he headed to the Interpretation of Scenarios for Scientific and Technical Intelligence he was a 32-year career in the Army.

“One of my experiences in the military was to be responsible for the Interpretation of Scenarios for Scientific and Technical Intelligence during the Cold War. Measurement of pieces of Soviet weaponry it based on photographs. It was my job. I look at the hole in the Pentagon and I look at the size of the plane that is said to have hit him. And I say, ‘The plane does not enter the hole.’ So what hit the Pentagon? Where is it? What is happening?”

Col. Robert Bowman -- PhD, U.S. Air Force (ret.) Director of Advanced Space Program Development under Presidents Ford and Carter. Air Force fighter pilot, more than 100 missions. PhD in Aeronautics, a nuclear engineer.

“A lot of this information, taken together, show that the official version, the official conspiracy theory of 9/11 are a bunch of nonsense. It is impossible. There is a second group of facts having to do with concealment. Taken together, these elements show that the levels of our government not want us to know what happened and who is responsible. Who has gained since September 11. Who hid crucial information. And who put first the patently false stories about 9/11? You think it’s pretty clear that it is people in high

places of the administration and all roads passing through Dick Cheney. I think the kindest thing we can say about George W. Bush and all the people of the U.S. government involved in this cover-up is that they were aware of impending attacks and have let it happen.”

Col. Ronald D. Ray -- U.S. Marine Corps (ret). Deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Reagan administration. Award-decorated Vietnam veteran (two Silver Star medals, a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart). Appointed by President George H.W. Bush to work in Battle Monuments Commission for the Americans. From 1990 to 1994 he worked as a military historian and Deputy Director of Field Operations for the Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington D.C.

“The former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Reagan administration and a multi decorated Vietnam veteran and Colonel has expressed his doubts about the official story of September 11 - calling it ‘the dog does not hunt.’ Ray has questioned the feasibility of having a budget of half a trillion dollars a year and not even be able to defend the Pentagon. Half a trillion dollars a year and a bunch of guys in a cave in Afghanistan were able to penetrate the network that is supposed to be half a trillion U.S. should provide national security.”

Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer -- U.S. Army (Ret.); former Army intelligence officer, Defense Intelligence Agency. Member of “Able Danger” with the aim of identifying the overall structure of al-Qa’ida. Former army chief dell Human Intelligence Program. Bronze medal to the value for the first of his two raids fighting in Afghanistan. 23-year military career the Intelligence. Witness in front of House Services Committee 02/15/2006 (page 18):

“After a team with two members of Able Danger the 9/11 Commission refused to provide any detailed investigation of the arguments that they had identified. Make a thorough check of these statements would be their responsibility, not simply ignore them based on what many now believe was a preconceived conclusion of the story on 11/9 that they wanted to tell. I consider it a failure of the staff of the Committee, as is evident from their recent baseless conclusion that the findings of Able Danger urban legends.”

Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski -- PhD, U.S. Air Force (ret). Former official of the political-military affairs in the office of Secretary of Defense. Staff Member, Office of the Director of the National Security Agency. A veteran of 20 years in aviation.

“A glance at the official report on 9/11, I was quickly distracted: Apparently mimicking the Committee on 11/9 in the past 20 months. One wonders if the entire commission was not secretly replaced by evil aliens the former Soviet Central Committee. I naively expected the most useful and constructive relationship.”

Major Scott Ritter -- U.S. Marine Corps. Former Marine Corps officer and chief weapons inspector of the UN Special Commission in Iraq from 1991 to 1998.

“I, like others, are frustrated by the report of the 9/11 Commission, lack of transparency by the U.S. government, both in terms of the executive branch of the Legislature that when it comes to showing all known facts on the case Sept. 11.”

Major Douglas Rokke -- PhD, U.S. Army (Ret.) Former Director U.S. Army Depleted Uranium Project. The impact at the Pentagon on 9/11:

“When you look at it as a whole, in particular the point of impact-free pieces of airplane, the size of the gaping hole in the building and the fact that the impact of the bullet has passed through several concrete walls it seems the work of a missile.”

Capt. Russ Wittenberg -- U.S. Air Force. Former Air Force fighter pilot, more than 100 combat missions. Airline pilot for Pan Am and United Airlines for 35 years. He had previously piloted the two hijacked plane on 9/11.

“The version of the government that we have given on September 11 is complete bullshit. It’s impossible for a guy who gets in the cockpit and fly like an ace.”

Barbara Honegger -- Senior Journalist of military matters at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1995. White House Policy Analyst and Special Assistant to the Assistant of the President Ronald Reagan (1981-83).

“The U.S. military, not al-Qa’ida, had continuous access weeks before Sept. 11, also to place the controlled demolition charges throughout all the superstructures of WTC 1 and WTC 2, and in WTC7, which brought down all three buildings on 9/11. A U.S. military plane, not one piloted by al-Qa’ida has made the number of high ability at high speed with a 270-degree dive towards the Pentagon. The Traffic Controllers of 9/11, the air traffic controllers were certain that it was a military aircraft while watching him on screen. Only a military aircraft, not a civil piloted by al-Qa’ida, would give the signal “friendly” which was used to disable the anti-missile batteries at the Pentagon as they approached the building. Only the U.S. military, not al-Qa’ida, had the ability to stop the Standard Operating Procedures to paralyze its emergency response system.”

Captain Gregory M. Zeigler -- PhD, U.S. Army. Former U.S. Army intelligence officer.

“I knew from September 18, 2001, that the official 9/11 was false. The anomalies overlapped rapidly: The hijackers’ names that did not appear in any of the published passenger lists; BBC reports; the fake identity of the alleged hijackers or the alleged hijackers found alive; the obvious demolitions of WTC 1, 2, and 7, the lack of a clear sign of fall of a Boeing 757 into the Pentagon.”

Raymond L. McGovern -- Former Director of National Intelligence Estimates, CIA. Responsible for the daily briefing of President Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. 27-year veteran of the CIA. Former U.S. Army officer.

“I think, in short, that there was a cover-up. The report of 11 September is a hoax. The question is: What has been covered up? It is gross misconduct, of gross negligence. There are a lot of questions unanswered. And why no answer, because the administration does not respond to questions. This is the end for me as Hitler in 1933 cynically exploited the burning of the parliament that is exactly what did our President using Sept. 11. The cynical way in which he played with our trauma, using it to justify attacking, making a war of aggression against a country that he knew he had nothing to do with the 11/9. This is enough for me. It is certainly an indictment by impeachment.”

William Christison -- Former National Intelligence officer and director of the CIA office of Regional Analysis and Policy. A 29-year veteran of the CIA.

“I think now that there is convincing evidence that the events of September were not carried out as would have us believe the Bush Administration and 9/11 Commission. Almost certainly not an airliner hit the Pentagon. The North and South Towers (World Trade Center) almost certainly not have fallen on the floor because he hit a hijacked plane. David Griffin thinks that it was of a completely internal work. I must say that I think so too. Since then, I am convinced that at least some elements of this U.S. government had contributed in one way or another to ensure that the 9/11 happens. The reason why the two towers in New York have really dropped and spilled the ground is due to the controlled explosions rather than just being hit by two airplanes. All the characteristics of these demolitions show that almost necessarily must have been some controlled explosions.”

Melvin A. Goodman -- Senior Analyst, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from 1974 to 1976. Former division chief and senior analyst at the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs from 1976 to 1986. Professor of International Security at the National War College 1986-2004. Currently Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy Adjunct Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University. Author and co-author of five books on international relations.

“I want to talk about the committee, the Committee on progress with the bad, and then on the conflict of interest in the committee which is very important to understand the failure of the same.”

Robert Baer -- Former CIA official houses, especially in the Middle East, Director of Operations. Awarded the Career Intelligence Medal. A veteran of 21 years in the CIA. The author of two books on the operations of the CIA, *See No Evil* and *Sleeping with the Devil*.

“Why is not investigated? Because no one has been held responsible for the 11/9. We found those responsible, after Pearl Harbour. Why has there not been any change in leadership? How come there were no political repercussions? Why has there not been any kind of complaint?”

Sibel D. Edmonds -- Former specialist translations, FBI on translations for counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations. Witness to the 9/11 Commission.

“I find that your relationship is seriously at fault, for not making mention of the serious problems of intelligence I know who have been confirmed and referred to as a witness of the Committee, I made aware. So, it must assume that other serious issues, I do not know were likewise omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations.”

Bogdan Dzakovic -- terrorism expert for 14 years, Security Division of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Head of FAA red team (anti-terrorism). Former team leader of the Federal Air Marshal program. A former officer of the Coast Guard. Witness to 9 / 11 Commission.

“The best thing I can say about it is that they have patched the work, without going into very real shortcomings. The worst, I think the commission’s report is misleading. And if you look at what the word ‘deception’ means, on the Webster’s dictionary, you see it’s ‘betrayal of trust.’”

Paul Hellyer -- Former Minister of National Defense of Canada. Former deputy prime minister. Former member of the House of Commons.

“I think the investigation was very shallow, very shallow. I would like to see an investigation much harder, much more in depth. I would like to see someone authoritative to those questions and insist on answers. We must try to get the truth. I hope someone has the courage and perseverance to press until we have it.”

Andreas von Buelow - PhD. Former State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of West Germany. Former Minister of Research and Technology. Member of the Bundestag (parliament) from 1969 to 1994.

“The official story is so inadequate and [far] fetched that there must be another. The planning of the attacks was technically and in terms of an organizational masterpiece. To hijack four huge airplanes within a few minutes, an hour and guide them to their targets with complicated maneuvers...this is unthinkable without years of support equipment hidden by the state and industry.”

Michael Meacher -- Former Secretary for Industry, Under Secretary for Health and Social Security, Environment Minister and member of the House of Commons (United Kingdom).

“It’s an escape, 580 pages long, of any serious explanation. The official report of the investigation said that the U.S. have never been able to find sources of funding 9/11. And then say, ‘That, after all, is not a matter of great importance.’ I find it shocking. It is a matter of central importance. It seems extraordinary that the United States, with their

magnificent military capabilities and the most technologically advanced nation of the globe, have completely and totally failed to follow this track.”

General Leonid Ivashov -- Co-Director of the Staff of the Russian 9/11. Head of the Department of General Affairs in the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Head of military cooperation at the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Secretary of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

“Only secret services and their current chiefs, or those retired but still have influence in the organizations of the State, possess the ability to plan, organize and conduct an operation of such magnitude.”

David Shayler- Former anti-terrorism official in the M15 (United Kingdom).

“The evidence available suggests that people in key posts at the FBI, State Department, CIA and so on, have not been faithful to the Constitution, who saw an opportunity in plans laid out by genuine Islamic terrorists, to complete an operation that would shock the world and would thus justify the irresponsible conduct of the United States in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq.”

Our investigation continues.

God Bless the innocent souls who paid the ultimate price.